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Articles
Tax Collection and Populist Rhetoric:
Shifting the Burden of Proof
in Tax Cases
by
Leo P. Martinez*

The power to tax is among the most fundamental and wide-reaching
powers of government.' It is axiomatic that any government needs the

financial support of its citizens, whether voluntarily or involuntarily obtained, to function efficiently or even to function at all. 2 Cicero aptly
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1. See C. WEBBER & A. WILDAVSKY, A HISTORY OF TAXATION AND EXPENDITURE
IN THE WESTERN WORLD 38-147 (1986) (outlining ancient systems of taxation); Epstein, Tax-

ation in a Lockean World, 4 J. Soc. PHIL. & POL., Autumn 1986, at 49 ("One constant refrain
of political and constitutional history treats taxation as an inherent and indispensible power of
the sovereign").
The United States Constitution expressly gives the Congress the "Power To lay and collect Taxes, Duties, Imposts and Excises .. " U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 1. The basic nature
of the power to tax has been widely recognized by the courts. See, e.g., Loan Ass'n v. Topeka,
87 U.S. (20 Wall.) 655, 663 (1874) (taxing power is the "strongest, the most pervading of the
powers of government"); Society for Sav. v. Coite, 73 U.S. (6 Wall.) 594, 606 (1867) (taxing
power "resides in government as a part of itself"); Providence Bank v. Billings & Pittman, 29
U.S. (4 Pet.) 514, 563 (1830) (the taxing power is of vital importance, essential to the existence
of government). The fundamental nature of taxation was implicitly recognized by Chief Justice Marshall's celebrated dictum regarding state taxation and sovereign immunity:
That the power to tax involves the power to destroy; that the power to destroy may
defeat and render useless the power to create; that there is a plain repugnance, in
conferring on one government a power to control the constitutional measures of another, which other, with respect to those very measures, is declared to be supreme
over that which exerts the control, are propositions not to be denied.
McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 431 (1819).
2. "The prompt collection of the revenue, and its faithful application, is one of the most
vital duties of government." Nichols v. United States, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 122, 129 (1868).
[239]
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stated: "Taxes are the sinews of the state."'3 Indeed, it has been observed
that a "world without taxation is a world without government." 4
Inextricably woven into the fabric of taxation is a fundamental notion of fairness. A postulate of any system of taxation is that the burden
of paying the tax should be borne equally by all or at least that the burden should be levied in a consistent and rational fashion. 5 Thus, where
there is perceived inconsistency or unfairness in the system, there is
heard a cry to refine or modify it.6
3.

Marcus Tullius Cicero, quoted in B. WOLFMAN & J. HOLDEN, ETHICAL PROBLEMS
(1981). Justices Holmes and Brandeis expressed a similar
thought: "Taxes are what we pay for civilized society." Compania de Tobacos v. Collector,
275 U.S. 87, 100 (1927) (Holmes, J. & Brandeis, J., dissenting). The Supreme Court in 1934
also declared that "taxes are the lifeblood of government." Bull v. United States, 295 U.S. 247,
259 (1934). A more recently expressed gloss on the matter is that "[o]n the budgetary base...
rest the political pillars of society." C. WEBBER & A. WILDAVSKY, supra note 1, at 31.
4. Epstein, supra note 1, at 49. Epstein goes on to discuss the dilemma presented by the
apparent fact that taxation involves institutional coercion. Id.
5. See Dane v. Jackson, 256 U.S. 589, 598-99 (1920); Tappan v. Merchants' Nat'l Bank,
86 U.S. (19 Wall.) 490, 504 (1873); Morton Salt Co. v. City of South Hutchinson, 159 F.2d
897, 901 (10th Cir. 1947); JACOBY, GUIDELINES OF INCOME TAX REFORM FOR THE 1960s, 1
IN FEDERAL TAX PRACTICE xviii

TAX REVISION COMPENDIUM, HOUSE COMM. ON WAYS AND MEANS, 86TH CONG. 1ST SESS.
157, 158-60 (Comm. Print 1959); Sneed, The Criteriaof FederalIncome Tax Policy, 17 STAN.

L. REV. 567, 567-69 (1965). Chief Justice Marshall was of the opinion that the power to tax
required popular confidence that it would not be abused. McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4
Wheat.) 316, 431 (1819).
The Constitution prohibits direct taxes unless such taxes are levied in proportion to the
populations of the states. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl.4. The second United States federal
income tax was held unconstitutional because, as a direct tax, it was not levied in proportion to
the states' populations. Pollack v. Farmers Loan & Trust Co., 157 U.S. 429, reh'g, 158 U.S.
601 (1895). The constitutional prohibition against disproportional direct taxes apparently had
its genesis in the concern that the levy of taxes be fair and consistent. See id. at 553-86, 158
U.S. at 617-37. Of course, the sixteenth amendment overrules the result in Pollock by expressly providing for an income tax without the section 9 prohibition. Pennsylvania Mut.
Indem. Co. v. Commissioner, 277 F.2d 16, 19-20 (3d Cir. 1960).
The Constitution requires that "all Duties, Imposts and Excises shall be uniform throughout the United States ...." U.S. CONST. art 1, § 8. Literally absent from this uniformity
requirement is the power to lay and collect taxes other than the indicated duties, imposts, and
excises. Despite the possibility that this apparent omission suggests inequity or unfairness, the
Supreme Court has held that this omission is a recognition that so long as taxes are geographically uniform they may apply to particular individuals in a nonuniform manner. See Knowlton v. Moore, 178 U.S. 41, 83-109 (1900); L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 245
(1977).

Fair distribution of the tax burden also is an often cited concern in enacting tax legislation. See, e.g., SENATE FINANCE COMM. REPORT ON THE TAX EQUITY AND FISCAL RESPONSIBILITY ACT OF 1982, S.REP. No. 494, 97th Cong., Sess. 97 (1982) (Act is designed to
improve tax equity); GENERAL EXPLANATION OF THE TAX REFORM ACT OF 1986 PREPARED
BY THE JOINT COMMITTEE, H.R. CONF. REP. No. 841, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 7 (1986) (primary
objective is to ensure that individuals with similar income pay similar amounts of tax).
6. Edmund Burke once noted that "[t]o tax and to please, no more than to love and be
wise, is not given to men." Burke, quoted in C. WEBBER & A. WILDAVSKY, supra note 1, at 1.
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A recent proliferation of proposed legislation that calls for the enactment of procedural safeguards for taxpayers in the tax collection system provide concrete examples of this sentiment. 7 Not surprisingly, this
legislation seems to enjoy popular political support., This support is derived not only from the traditional enmity reserved for the tax collector,
but also from documented incidents of abusive and, in a few cases, criminal conduct directed against taxpayers by Internal Revenue Service
(IRS) employees. 9 Predictably, one of the authors of these bills charges
that under the current system, "the IRS has too many rights, and the
taxpayer too few."' 0
The bills generally call for sweeping changes in the system of tax
collection.I A common provision in these bills would change the burden
It follows that the exercise in any way, whether fair or unfair, of the power to tax inevitably
results in resistance. This resistance to what appears to be socially fundamental has led some
to suggest that "[a]n across-the-board attack on the budgetary base is equivalent to revolution." Id. at 31. Notwithstanding (or perhaps by reason of) the revolutionary aspect of resistance to taxation, the United States enjoys an extensive tradition of avoiding the tax collector.
J. HAWS, A BRIEF HISTORY OF AMERICAN RESISTANCE TO TAXATION, INCOME TAX COMPLIANCE 113 (1983).
Of course, one person's perception of tax equity is another's unfairness or inconsistency.
See Bittker, Income Tax "'Loopholes"and PoliticalRhetoric, 71 MIcH. L. REV. 1099 (1973).
7. See, e.g., S. 604, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. (1987); H.R. 3470, 100th Cong., 1st Sess.
(1987)(introduced by Congressman Flippo and is identical to S. 604); H.R. 3346, 100th Cong.,
1st Sess. (1987)(Congressman Pickle has also introduced a bill entitled the "Taxpayer Safeguard and Protection Act"); H.R. 634, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. (1987)(Congressman Dannemeyer introduced this bill, entitled the "Taxpayer Protection Act"). Senate Bill 604 was
introduced on February 26, 1987 by Senators Pryor (D.- Ark.), Grassley (R.- Iowa) and Reid
(D.- Nev.) for the ostensible purpose of promoting and protecting taxpayer rights. S. 604
parallels S. 579, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. (1987). S. 579 was introduced by Senators Reid, Nickles, and Breaux as "The Taxpayers' Bill of Rights Act."
8. Fighting IRS.: Uneven Match, N.Y. Times, May 5, 1987, at 34, col. 1; Senator
Charles E. Grassley, Press Release (Feb. 24, 1987), reprinted in TAX NOTES, Doc. 87-1018
[hereinafter Grassley, Press Release]. The author confesses that eliminating the need to save
receipts and keep records holds a certain fascination and attraction.
9. In fiscal year 1986, 259 criminal cases involving current or former IRS employees
were filed and 236 resulted in conviction or guilty pleas. Wall St. J., July 8, 1987, at 1, col. 5.
There has been some indication that the IRS is responding to correct errant agents' behavior.
Wall St. J., Sept. 25, 1987, at 1, col. 5; see also Taxpayer Complaints: Hearings before the
Subcommittee of the House Committee on Ways and Means, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. (1980);
Saunders, The Scariest Dunner, FORBES, Nov. 2, 1987, at 76-81.
10. Grassley, Press Release (Feb. 24, 1987), supra note 8, at 87-1018.
11. For example, Senate Bill 604 as originally proposed would have made the following
changes to existing tax collection procedures: (1) The Secretary of the Treasury would be
required to distribute to all taxpayers a comprehensive statement setting forth various taxpayer
rights including appeals procedures, refund and complaint procedures, and the procedures
available to the IRS in enforcing the revenue laws. § 2.
(2) An Office of Inspector General would be created under the auspices of the Inspector
General Act of 1978 (5 U.S.C. App. § 3) within the department of the Treasury. § 3. According to the Senate report on the Inspector General Act the purpose of the Act was to create an
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of proof in tax cases by placing the burden of proof on the IRS on all
Office of the Inspector General and Auditor General to consolidate resources to combat fraud,
waste, abuse, and mismanagement in certain executive departments and federal agencies. S.
REP. No. 1071, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 1, reprintedin 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS
2676, 2676. Although it was recognized that the Department of the Treasury could benefit
from more rigorous auditing, an inspector general was not originally created in the Department because "it would be undesirable to superimpose an inspector general, who is basically a
law enforcement official, on law enforcement agencies." Id. at 14, 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. &
ADMIN. NEWS at 2689.
(3) New Code § 7519 would be enacted and would provide for a number of taxpayer
rights including the recording by taxpayers of IRS interviews and a modified "Miranda" type
warning to be given taxpayers prior to interviews. § 4. Interestingly, the Bill is silent as to any
sanction for failure to give such warning. Moreover, nothing in the Bill or the legislative
history so far suggests any intent to give exclusionary effect to evidence obtained as a result of
failure to give the warning.
(4) The Comptroller General's authority would be expanded to oversee the administration of the internal revenue laws by the IRS. § 5.
(5) Personnel evaluation of performance of IRS employees would not be based in any
way on the amount of revenue collected. § 6.
(6) Investigation by IRS officers and employees as to the beliefs or associations of any
individual or organization would be made criminal, except otherwise lawful investigations concerning organized crime. § 7. A civil cause of action would be created for investigations conducted in violation of this provision. Id.
(7) The levy and distraint provisions of the Code would be amended to increase notice
periods and the class of property exempt from levy would be expanded. § 8. Significantly, the
Bill would create an "economic levy" rule, that is, no levy could be made on property if the
expenses in connection with the levy would exceed the fair market value of the property. Id.
(8) Judicial review of jeopardy assessments would be expanded. § 9.
(9) New Code § 6159 would authorize the Secretary of the Treasury to allow the installment payment of outstanding tax liability. § 10. Such installment payment of taxes would be
authorized (presumably at the taxpayer's option) if the outstanding liability did not exceed
$20,000 and if the taxpayer has not been delinquent in the payment of tax liability installments
in the preceding three years. § 10(b).
(10) Written advice given to taxpayers by the IRS would be binding and any deficiency
resulting from heeding such advice would be abated, as long as any error in the advice was not
due to an inadequacy on the part of the taxpayer. § 11. Moreover, each officer or employee of
the IRS would, at the time any oral advice is given, have to inform the taxpayer that oral
advice does not bind the IRS although no sanction is provided for failure to so advise a taxpayer. § 11(b).
(11)
The Office of Ombudsman would be empowered to issue "taxpayer assistance orders" to provide relief from levy on a taxpayer's property if the Ombudsman determined that
the taxpayer would suffer irreparable harm, loss or if the levy was carried out in violation of
law. § 12.
(12) The imposition of an IRS lien would be appealable to the Secretary of the Treasury.
§ 13.
(13)
Sales of seized property could not be limited artificially to the outstanding liability
plus expenses of sale if the fair market value of the property exceeded such sum. § 14.
(14) Class audits of taxpayers involved in a particular trade, business or profession
would be limited by requiring the IRS to comply with certain notice requirements and to allow
affected taxpayers to contest alleged deficiencies individually or through a spokesman. § 15.
(15)
The Regulatory Flexibility Act would be made applicable to the IRS. § 17. The
Regulatory Flexibility Act is designed to ensure that federal agencies tailor their regulatory

January 1988]

BURDEN OF PROOF IN TAX CASES

issues in all administrative and judicial proceedings. 12 Such proposals to
place the burden of proof on the IRS surface periodically.1 3 While no
such proposal has been yet adopted by Congress, the sponsors of these
proposals remain firm in their belief that the government should bear the
burden of proof in tax cases. 1 4 Their willingness to accept tax relief in
exchange for a price apparently paid by the IRS clouds the fact that retention of the present system generally is more consistent with their constituents' financial and personal interests.
The lack of meaningful debate on the burden of proof shifting provisions indicates widespread ignorance as to the historical role played by
the burden of proof in the tax collection system. While the curbing of the
tax collector's powers has an undeniably seductive appeal, shifting of the
burden of proof in tax cases must be closely examined to determine
and informational requirements to the scale of the businesses and organizations under their
authority. The Act requires agencies which promulgate rules to provide information regarding
the rationale and legal basis for any proposed rule as well as how the rule may affect smaller
organizations in terms of reporting and record keeping. 5 U.S.C.A. § 601-03 (West Supp.
1987).
12. For example, section 16(a) of S. 604 originally provided:
Notwithstanding any other provision of law, in all administrative and judicial
proceedings between the IRS and a taxpayer, the burden of proof on all issues shall
rest upon the IRS, except that in the event the taxpayer is the sole possessor of evidence that would not otherwise be available to the IRS, the taxpayer may be required
to present the minimum amount of information necessary to support his position.
In a revised version of the bill introduced October 2, 1987, this provision was deleted. 37
TAX NOTES, Oct. 5, 1987, at 12. In its place, the burden of proof would be placed on the IRS
to prove that its claim against the taxpayer was substantially justified to prevent a taxpayer
from recovering professional, presumably attorneys, fees. Id. Still alive in its present form is
H.R. 634, introduced by Congressman Dannemeyer as the "Taxpayer Protection Act." H.R.
634, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. (1987). H.R. 634 would create new Code § 7429 which would
provide:
In any administrative and judicial proceedings between the Internal Revenue Service
and a taxpayer, the burden of proof on all issues shall rest upon the Internal Revenue
Service: Provided,however, that in those instances where the taxpayer is the sole possessor of evidence that would not otherwise be available to the Internal Revenue
Service, the taxpayer may be required to present the minimum amount of information necessary to support his position.

Id. § 11.
13. For example, in hearings conducted before the Senate in 1925, a representative of the
American Institute of Accountants seriously urged that the burden of proof be shifted to the
government in tax cases. Hearings on Revenue Revision, 1925, Before the House Comm. on
Ways and Means, 69th Cong., 1st Sess. 877 (1925). More recently, Congressman Collins of
Texas introduced a bill which provided: "In all administrative and judicial proceedings between the Internal Revenue Service and a taxpayer, the burden of proof on all issues shall rest
on the Internal Revenue Service." H.R. 2389, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. (1981). The language in
the 1981 bill is strikingly similar to the burden of proof provision of the original Senate Bill 604
and House Bill 634. See supra note 11.
14. 36 TAX NOTES, Sept. 14, 1987, at 1029.
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whether the change will produce the stated goal of promoting equity, or
whether it represents uncritical acceptance of a popular fancy without
due consideration of the role that the burden of proof plays in the system
of tax collection. In order to address that concern, section I of this Article discusses the assignment of the burden of proof in general. Section II
discusses the origin of the burden of proof rules in the tax collection
system in particular. Section III identifies and analyzes the rationales
behind the current tax system's burden of proof rules. Finally, section
IV assesses the anticipated effects of a shift in the burden of proof from
taxpayers to the IRS. This Article concludes that the proposal to shift
the burden of proof in tax cases from the taxpayer to the IRS, however
attractive the prospect may seem, affords a brief glimpse into Pandora's
box. As with the opening of that box, the proposed change in the allocation of the burden of proof is ill-advised and, with the exception of the
critical examination that follows, should remain unexplored.
I.
A.

Burden of Proof in General

Definitions

In order to obtain a desired result, the parties to a controversy must
persuade a neutral third party, either judge or jury, to act or refrain from
acting in accordance with a predetermined pattern of conduct. The party
with the obligation of persuasion-what Wigmore termed the risk of
nonpersuasion-is said to bear the burden of proof.15 The effect of nonpersuasion on a party with the burden of proof is that the particular issue
16
at stake in the litigation will be decided against the party.
The burden of proof in civil controversies serves a number of desirable goals. In his 1911 Treatise on the Modern Law of Evidence,
Chamberlayne postulated that practical restrictions as to time and space
necessitate the assignment of a burden of proof. 17 According to
15. F. JAMES & G. HAZARD, CIVIL PROCEDURE § 7.6, at 314 (3d ed. 1985); C. MCCORMICK, EVIDENCE § 336, at 947-48 (1984); 9 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2485, at 285 (J. Chadbourne rev. 1981).
16. C. MCCORMICK, supra note 15, § 336, at 947-48; 9 J. WIGMORE, supra note 15,
§ 2485, at 285-86.
17. C. CHAMBERLAYNE, A TREATISE ON THE MODERN LAW OF EVIDENCE § 931, at
1093 (1911). Chamberlayne said:
Where, for example,... scientific truth is under investigation, there is no limitation
of time as to when the ultimate conclusion must be reached, nor any restriction imposed regarding the place at which the investigation must be conducted. Science,
therefore, acknowledges no burden of proof... [T]he mentally untrained nature of
the jury and the limits of time which should be devoted to a trial ... make it necessary that before the trial should begin ... it should . .. be known ... which of the
parties is to wage an offensive and which a defensive combat.

January 1988]

BURDEN OF PROOF IN TAX CASES

Chamberlayne, the roots of our modem trial procedure can be found in
trial by ordeal or combat, which suggests the necessity of determining
which of the parties is to wage offensive combat and which is to wage
defensive combat.18 Whatever the merits of Chamberlayne's analogy to
trial by combat, it is clear that the burden of proof serves as a practical
starting point for resolution of a dispute. 19
Recognizing that the burden of proof is grounded in necessity does
not suggest that practicality alone supports its existence. The fundamental nature of the role of the burden of proof in dispute resolution also
suggests its utility. That is, there must be a means by which a neutral
arbiter can ascertain the existence or nonexistence of facts. 20 Logically, a
neutral arbiter of a dispute must be persuaded that the uncertain is clear
or that the improbable exists.2 ' The burden of proof provides one tool
that can be used by the decision-maker to reach a result if proof is equivocal or if proof fails to reach a threshold level of persuasion.22 If a party
is unable to so persuade the decision-maker that a fact exists or that the
uncertainty is clear, that party necessarily will have failed to achieve the
23
desired result.
The burden of proof also functions to reduce confusion. 24 The burden of proof makes decision-making predictable by preordaining a result.
If a party fails to meet the burden of proof, that party will fail; con25
versely, if a party satisfies its burden of proof, that party will prevail.
The allocation of the burden of proof introduces into decision-making a
Id.
18. Id.
19. See W. BEST, THE PRINCIPALS OF THE LAW OF EVIDENCE 46 (Morgan ed. 1882)
(the taxpayers are left with the choice between choosing haphazardly through barbarism and
ignorance or following unbending and dogmatic rules relating to the burden of proof); B.
JONES, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAW OF EVIDENCE 849 (2d ed. 1926); McBaine, Burden of
Proof,Degrees of Belief 32 CALIF. L. REV. 242, 242 (1944).
20. MeBaine, supra note 19, at 244.
21. W. BEST, supra note 19, at 46; C. MCCORMICK, supra note 15, at 948.
22. This is particularly the case in the commonly occurring situation in which evidence
presented is contradictory, of questionable veracity, or simply deficient in some respect. See
McBaine, supra note 19, at 246.
23. C. MCCORMICK, supra note 15, at 948; see, e.g., Pacific Portland Cement Co. v. Food
Mach. & Chem. Corp., 178 F.2d 541, 547 (9th Cir. 1949) (the party upon whom the burden of
proof rests will lose if no evidence is given on either side).
24. F. JAMES & G. HAZARD, supra note 15, at 315; C. MCCORMICK, supra note 15, at
948.
25. C. MCCORMICK, supra note 15, at 948. Better or at least more informed decision
making is apt to follow if an arbiter is clearly instructed as to the outcome which follows a
determination of whether the requisite amount of proof has been presented as to a controversy.
Id.
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simple algorithm that imposes order and structure upon the dispute resolution process.
By contrast, if no burden of persuasion were acknowledged by the
courts, the triers of fact might assign their own burden, substituting their
own notions of equity or justice for those mandated by law. McCormick
suggests that "[s]uch a result would be most undesirable," because rational decision-making requires a consistent rather than a case-by-case
26
determination and resolution of controversy.
The burden of proof thus provides the parties to a controversy the
necessary structure and guidance to pursue a claim. This responsibility
of proof may well act to impose a very real risk of loss on a particular
party.2 7 Indeed, a certain amount of risk-bearing and risk-shifting may
be reasonably required of any moderately sophisticated and efficient dis28
pute resolution system.
B.

The Burden of Production and the Burden of Persuasion

Confusion over the definition of "burden of proof" exists because
the term has been used to describe two distinct aspects of trial proceedings: first, the burden of persuasion and second, the burden of production. 29 The burden of persuasion generally is defined as the obligation of
26. Id.
27. Viewed in this light, Wigmore's reference to the burden of proof as the risk of nonpersuasion is especially appropriate. 9 J. WIGMORE, supra note 15, at 285.
28. Professor J.P. McBaine warned what would happen if rules on burden did not exist:
No lawsuit can be decided rationally without the application of the commonplace
concept of burden of proof-the duty to persuade-or as is sometimes otherwise
stated the risk of non-persuasion. Nor can any legal system be praised for practicability if there exists vagueness, uncertainty or confusion as to the scope or extent of
the burden, or if the language commonly employed to describe its scope or extent is
not easily comprehensible to those whose duty it is to determine whether the burden
has been sustained. . . . Certainly a legal system which would take no account of
whose obligation it is to persuade the trier of the facts would be a crude one, woefully
lacking in reasonableness and wisdom. In modern society such a system would soon
break down completely.
McBaine, supra note 19, at 242.
29. Abilene Sheet Metal, Inc. v. N.L.R.B., 619 F.2d 332, 339 (5th Cir. 1980); Wong Kam
Chong v. United States, 11 F.2d 707, 710 (9th Cir. 1940); C. CHAMBERLAYNE, supra note 17,
at 1096-98; F. JAMES & G. HAZARD, supra note 15, at 313-14; C. MCCORMICK, supra note 15,
at 947; 9 J. WIGMORE, supra note 15, at 287-300; McNaughton, Burden of Production of Evidence: A Function of Burden of Persuasion, 68 HARV. L. Rr'v. 1382, 1382-83 (1955).
In describing how this two-burden concept operates, commentators seem to rely primarily
on one of two models: the Wigmore model or the McNaughton model. J. WIGMORE, supranote 15, at 292-99.
Wigmore describes the burden of proof as containing three distinct linear stages. The first
and last stages represent stages at which the judge must decide an issue, while the middle stage
represents the point at which an issue is before the jury. The operation of this model can best
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persuading a trier of fact, whether judge or jury, on the disputed issues in
be explained through the use of a simple example. Suppose Litigant A begins at the initial
stage of the Wigmore model where she is initially faced with the burden of production. In
order to move to the middle stage, she must produce a certain threshold amount of evidence.
This evidence must be sufficient to cause the judge to make the decision to place the issue
before the jury for consideration. If the evidence is insufficient, Litigant A's case would fail to
reach the middle stage and the judge would be compelled to grant a directed verdict for her
opponent. If A is able to produce enough evidence to satisfy the judge, her case enters the
middle stage. There she must meet the burden of persuasion in order to advance to the third
stage. If she fails to meet the burden of persuasion, the jury must resolve the issue against
Litigant A and in favor of her opponent. If, however, Litigant A provides such compelling
evidence that she meets the burden of persuasion, the case shifts to the last stage and the duty
of producing evidence shifts to the other party. The judge must then decide whether the other
party has presented sufficient evidence to reenter the middle stage for jury consideration. If
the other party fails to meet his burden, the judge must decide for Litigant A. If the other
party meets the burden of production, the jury must again decide the matter. It is important to
note that under the Wigmore formulation, the burden of production can shift while the burden
of persuasion remains with Litigant A.
According to Wigmore, the important practical distinction between the two senses of the
burden of proof is that "[t]he [burden of persuasion] operates when the case has come into the
hands of the jury, while the... [burden of production] implies a liability to a ruling by the
judge, disposing of the issue without leaving the question open to the jury's deliberations." 9 J.
WIGMORE, supra note 15, at 299 (emphasis omitted).
In a 1955 Harvard Law Review article, Professor John T. McNaughton called the Wigmore model "misleading." McNaughton, supra note 29, at 1384. He claimed that the Wigmore model inaccurately implied that the burden of production was satisfied when the
existence or (nonexistence) of the fact appeared to be some small percent probable, such as
20% or 30%. According to McNaughton, the burden of production should be satisfied only
when the judge believes there is a possibility that a reasonable jury will believe that existence of
the fact is over 50% probable. Id. at 1385. It follows then, according to McNaughton, that
the burden of production is interdependent with the burden of persuasion rather than a completely distinct factor. Id.
McNaughton's model of the burden of proof attempts to demonstrate this relationship.
McNaughton's model is a simple horizontal axis with probabilities ranging from 0% to 100%.
This axis represents the jury's belief in the probability of the truth of the issue as presented by
Litigant A. If, for example, the jury believes an issue is more probably true than not, the jury
decision could be represented by any point to the right of number 50, and in a civil case,
Litigant A (the proponent) could prevail (i.e., Litigant A would be said to meet the burden of
persuasion). Superimposed on this model is the burden of production. As in the Wigmore
model, the judge must decide whether a matter is within the jury's competence. With the
McNaughton model, the judge must determine a realistic range for ajury decision. McNaughton believes that this range determination decides the decision path to be followed. Three
possibilities exist. The first possibility is that the judge may decide that a reasonable jury
would find the issue to have less than a 50% chance of truth, for example the range between a
10% and 30% chance of truth. In such a case, the judge would direct a verdict for the opponent because the judge necessarily would decide that no reasonable jury would find the issue to
more likely to be true than not. The second possibility is that the judge could find that a
reasonable jury would find the issue to have more than a 50% chance of truth, for example
between an 80% and 90% chance of truth. In that case a directed verdict for the proponent
would result because no reasonable chance of a decision in the opponent's favor could occur.
The third possibility is that the judge believes a reasonable jury would find that the issue
straddled the 50% probability mark, and thus the issue could be given to the jury. For exam-
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a controversy. 30 The burden of production is a procedural device which
allows a judge to determine whether a dispute is within the limits of a
jury's competence. 31 The burden of production recognizes that the extent of a jury's opportunity to decide a matter does not fall on the jury by
default, rather the judge exerts control over what the jury is allowed to
consider. 32 The distinction between the burden of persuasion and the
burden of production is clear. Each allows for different levels of decision-making by judge and jury, and each is associated with a different
level of risk. Moreover, there exists a difference between the two burdens
that is not readily apparent and that serves to place them in sharp contrast with each other. While the burden of production may shift if a
sufficient amount of evidence is presented, in contrast, the burden of persuasion is fixed and does not change during the course of a trial. 33 The
ple, if the judge determined the chance of truth to be between 40% and a 60%, then the
decision is turned over to the trier of fact. Id. at 1387.
McNaughton embellishes his basic model by attempting to account for credibility. By
assessing the credibility of the evidence presented and resolving doubt as to credibility first one
way and then the other, a judge can establish a range that he can adjust with respect to the
burden of production. In any case involving credibility, therefore, the evidence at any moment
will give rise to two ranges. The range applicable on opponent's motion is not the one applicable on proponent's motion. For example, on a motion by the proponent for a directed verdict,
the judge estimates that, with questions of credibility resolved against her, no reasonable jury
would believe the existence of the fact to be more than 25% or less than 5% probable, so the
motion fails. If however, the opponent moved for a directed verdict instead, the judge resolves
question of credibility against him, and might find that no reasonable jury would believe the
fact to be more than 65% or less than 45% probable. This motion must also be denied. If
fewer issues of credibility had to be resolved, then the two ranges would move closer together
or even overlap. Id. at 1389.
The McNaughton model seems to resolve the theoretical anomalies in the Wigmore
model and its principles have been noted by the authorities. F. JAMES & G. HAZARD, supra
note 15, at 318-321 n.3; C. MCCORMICK, supra note 15, at 946 n.1. The McNaughton model,
however, is not universally used. E.g., G. LILLY, THE LAW OF EVIDENCE 42-44 (1978) (viewing burden of production as more distinct and independent from the burden of persuasion than
does McNaughton).
30. F. JAMES & G. HAZARD, supra note 15, at 313; C. MCCORMICK, supra note 15, at
947; 9 J. WIGMORE, supra note 15, at 283; McNaughton, supra note 29, at 1382-83. Confusion
is compounded by the fact that the burden of production is itself used to describe two distinct
aspects of the burden of proof concept. McNaughton, supra note 29, at 1383 (1955).
31. F. JAMES & G. HAZARD, supra note 15, at 318-21; 9 J. WIGMORE, supra note 15. at
292; McNaughton, supra note 29, at 1383. If the burden of production is not met, the court
decides the case and the jury has no role to play. 9 J. WIGMORE, supra note 15, at 292-93.
32. Id. at 293.
33. Simpson v. Home Petroleum Corp., 770 F.2d 499, 503 (5th Cir. 1985); Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co. v. General Elec. Co., 758 F.2d 319, 322 (8th Cir. 1985); O'Brien v. Equitable
Life Assurance Soc'y of United States, 212 F.2d 383, 386-87 (8th Cir. 1954); C.
CHAMBERLAYNE, supra note 15, at 1142-43; B. JONES, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAW OF
EVIDENCE 848, 859 (2d ed. 1926); C. MCCORMICK, supra note 15, at 952; 9 J. WIGMORE,
supra note 15, at 300-01.
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term "burden of proof" is used in this Article to mean this unchanging
burden of persuasion.
C. Allocation of the Burden of Proof: Rules and Rationale
While the need for allocating the burden of proof is inescapable,
difficulty arises in choosing the method of assigning the burden to a particular party. If the risk of loss inheres in the possession of the burden of
proof, the allocation of the burden of proof to a particular party is of
paramount importance in dispute resolution. That the method of choice
itself may be at the heart of a contest early in a trial should come as no
surprise.
The rules governing allocation of the burden of persuasion are either
fixed by statute or exist as developed in the common law. The allocation
rules provide a framework within which it is possible to predict whether
and under what circumstances a party might be assigned the burden of
proof. These rules can be synthesized into several broad policy-oriented
principles. The following sections discuss these principles for determining which party has the burden of proof.
(1) The Burden of Proofis Assigned to the Party Who Has the Affirmative
of the Issue
The basic allocation rule provides that the party who has the affirmative of an issue is assigned the burden of proof.34 The reason advanced
for the rule is that the negative of an issue is more difficult to prove-the
corollary being that disputes are more easily resolved if the burden of
35
proof is made easy to satisfy.
This rule has been criticized widely. It has been suggested that this
doctrine is erroneously interpreted to mean that even though a party is
required to plead a fact, proof is not required if the averment is negative
rather than affirmative in form. 36 The primary point behind this criti34. Arthur v. Unkart, 96 U.S. 118, 122 (1877); United States v. Linn, 42 U.S. (I How.)
104, 111 (1843); Pacific Portland Cement Co. v. Food Mach. & Chem. Corp., 178 F.2d 541,
547 (9th Cir. 1949); Bauer v. Clark, 161 F.2d 397, 400 (7th Cir. 1947); Gilmore v. United
States, 93 F.2d 774, 776 (5th Cir. 1938); In re Chicken Antitrust Litigation, 560 F. Supp. 1006,
1008 (N.D. Ga. 1982); C. CHAMBERLAYNE, supra note 17, at 1116; F. JAMES & G. HAZARD,
supra note 15, at 322; MCCORMICK, supra note 15, at 949; Laughlin, The Location of the
Burden of Persuasion, 18 PITT. L. REV. 3, 5-6 (1956); see Smith v. Hill, 232 Mass. 188, 190,
122 N.E. 310, 310 (1919), aff'd, 260 U.S. 592 (1923).
35. Laughlin, supra note 34, at 5-6. This idea has sometimes found expression in the
standard that the burden of proof settles on the party on whom the burden rests more lightly.
See Rodgers v. United States, 66 F. Supp. 663, 667 (E.D. Pa. 1946).
36. McCormick, supra note 15, at 949.
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cism is that language is all too easily manipulated. 37 The easy response
to this objection is the well-worn expression that this rule simply exalts
38
form over substance.
A more reasoned approach suggests that the form of an allegation
should not be controlling. Today it is more often said that the affirmative
includes any negative proposition that a party might have to show. 39 For
example, in an action for malicious prosecution, the rule that requires a
plaintiff to persuade the jury that the defendant had no probable cause
gives the plaintiff the burden of proving not only a verbal negative, but
40
also a substantive negative, nonexistence.
While the courts seldom comment on the apparently well-settled
rule that the party who has the affirmative of an issue also has the burden
of proof, the fact that the rule is subject to criticism does not require that
it be abandoned altogether. Of course, such a result presupposes that
each matter at issue in a trial has a naturally occurring affirmative or
negative form. 4 1 Whether this is true may be a matter of philosophical
dispute. Support for the continued vitality of the rule, however, lies in
the fact that notwithstanding the widespread and longstanding criticism
of the affirmative issue allocation rule, many courts continue to rely on it
42
to determine the allocation of the burden of proof.
(2) The Burden of Proof is Assigned to the Plaintiffas to All Elements of His
Cause of Action
Ordinarily, the burden of proof is with the plaintiff-the party who

initiates the action or proceeding. 4 3 There is, however, no strict rule that
37. F. JAMES & G. HAZARD, supra note 15, at 322; Laughlin, supra note 34, at 5-6.
38. This problem was identified early by Phillips who observed that the burden is "upon
him who asserts ... the affirmative in substance, not in mere form." S. PHILLIPS & T. ARNOLD, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF EVIDENCE 810 (10th ed. 1859); see B. JONES, supra note

33, at 878; C. MCCORMICK, supra note 15, at 949.
39.

E. MORGAN, BASIC PROBLEMS OF EVIDENCE 26-27 (1963).

40. Id.; see, e.g., Williams v. Coombs, 179 Cal. App. 3d 626, 631, 224 Cal. Rptr. 865, 868
(1986) ("plaintiff must plead and prove that prior action (1) was commenced by or at the
direction of the defendant and was pursued to a legal termination in his, plaintiff's, favor; (2)
was brought without probable cause; and (3) was initiated with malice"); Lucchesi v. Giannini
& Uniack, 158 Cal. App. 3d 777, 785, 205 Cal. Rptr. 62, 66 (1984) (malicious prosecution
elements).
41. See Laughlin, supra note 34, at 5-6.
42. See, e.g., Mashpee Tribe v. New Seabury Corp., 592 F.2d 575, 589-90 (1st Cir.) (applying principles to factual situation involving Indian tribal status), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 866
(1979), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 866 (1983); Hautley Cheese Co. v. Wine Brokers, Inc. 706
S.W.2d 920, 922 (Mo. App. 1986) (generally the party asserting the affirmative should bear the
burden of proof, though the rule is not invariable).
43. F. JAMES & G. HAZARD, supra note 15, at 322; 9 J. WIGMORE, supra note 15, at 288;
B. JONES, supra note 33, at 848; see Arthur v. Unkart, 96 U.S. 118, 122 (1877); Bell v. Penn-
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the burden is on the party who brings suit. When the defendant admits
the plaintiff's alleged cause of action, he absolves the plaintiff from the
necessity of making any proof in support of his claim. The defendant
then takes the role of actor in the suit and must satisfy the court of the
grounds of any counterclaim initiated by him. 44 Thus, a defendant, as
the initiator of a counterclaim, may also bear the burden of proof based
45
on this allocation rule.
As with the affirmative issue allocation rule, the general rule that the

plaintiff bears the burden of proof has been subject to much criticism.
The critics base their argument on the idea that the party to whose case
the issue is essential bears the burden of proof.4 6 According to the critics, the rule simply restates the issue at hand in another form.4 7 That is,
the burden of proof determines which party will lose as to an issue if the
burden is not met. Thus, in the critics' view, by placing the burden of
proof for such issues on a party, the rule merely states that the party with
the burden of proof bears the burden of proof 4 8 In other words, the
critics argue that the assignment of the burden of proof is supported by
circular reasoning.
The courts apparently have overlooked the tautological nature of
the rule. 49 While the courts provide little guidance for use of the plaintiff
allocation rule, one may speculate that the rule is grounded not in the
sylvania R.R., 284 F.2d 297, 298 (7th Cir. 1960); New York, New Haven & Hartford Ry. v.
Seaboard Sales Corp., 258 F.2d 376, 378 (1st Cir. 1958); Compagnie des Bauxites de Guinee v.
Insurance Corp. of N. Am., 551 F. Supp. 1239, 1242 (W.D. Pa. 1982); Dyco Petroleum Corp.
v. Rucker Co., 443 F. Supp. 685, 693 (E.D. Okla. 1977).
44.

J. THAYER, A PRELIMINARY TREATISE ON EVIDENCE AT THE COMMON LAW 369

(1898).
45. Otero v. Buslee, 695 F.2d 1244, 1248 (10th Cir. 1982) (defendant has burden of proof
on affirmative defenses); Allen v. Carmen, 578 F. Supp. 951, 962-63 (D.D.C. 1983) (defendant
has burden of proof on affirmative defense of latches); Dyco Petroleum, 443 F. Supp. at 695
(defendant has burden of proof on counterclaims). This may partially explain the use of the
phrase "affirmative defense" used in connection with a defendant's claim. Laughlin, supra note
34, at 18.
46.

C. MCCORMICK, supra note 15, at 949-50; 9 J. WIGMORE, supra note 15, at 288;

Laughlin, supra note 34, at 6-7.
47. C. MCCORMICK, supra note 15, at 950 (citing Cleary, Presumingand Pleading: An
Essay on Juristic Immaturity, 12 STAN. L. REV. 5, 11 (1959)).
48. Id.; Laughlin, supra note 34, at 6.
49. See, e.g., Arthur v. Unkart, 96 U.S. 118, 122 (1877) (party alleging illegality in contract has burden of proof); Bell v. Pennsylvania R.R., 284 F.2d 297, 298 (7th Cir. 1960)
("Plaintiffs have the burden of furnishing evidence in the support of the material allegations of
the complaint"); New York, New Haven & Hartford Ry. v. Seaboard Sales Corp., 258 F.2d
376, 378 (1st Cir. 1958) (burden of proof is ordinarily on the plaintiff); Compagnie des Bauxites de Guineau v. Insurance Corp. of North America, 551 F. Supp. 1239, 1242 (W.D.P. 1982)
(plaintiff bears burden of proof); Dyco Petroleum, 443 F. Supp. at 695 (burden of proof is on
the claimant).
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"loss of case" possibility, but rather in the concept that the initiator of an
action, including a defendant using affirmative defenses, should bear the
burden of proof. It is reasonable that the party seeking to change the
status quo, normally the plaintiff in an action, should bear the burden of
proof.5 0 It is the plaintiff then who should be charged with the burden of
proof on the basis that the plaintiff is the party who must establish facts
necessary to remove the case from mere conjecture. 51 Viewed in this
way, the plaintiff allocation rule is more nearly defensible.
(3)

The Burden of Proof is Assigned to the Party Who is Alleging a
Disfavored Contention

Many cases suggest that the party alleging a disfavored contention,

such as illegality or fraud by an opponent, bears the burden of proof. 52

Thus, public policy considerations affect the choice of method used in
assigning the burden of proof to a party by favoring one party over another with respect to particular issues. With the disfavored contention
allocation rule, the party who alleges that the opponent engaged in reprehensible conduct is given the burden of proof.53 For example, a party
claiming negligence is alleging a disfavored contention, and therefore a
court may choose to restrain such actions by imposing on the plaintiff the
burden of showing the absence of contributory negligence as well as the
54
plaintiff's burden of proving negligence.
(4)

The Burden of Proofis Assigned to the Party Alleging
the Least Likely Scenario

The party who seeks to establish the improbable generally is allocated the burden of proof, all other things being equal. 55 According to
50. See G. LILLY, THE LAW OF EVIDENCE 41 (1978).
51. Aetna Casualty and Sur. Co. v. General Elec. Co., 758 F.2d 319, 322 (8th Cir. 1985).
52. F. JAMES & G. HAZARD, supra note 15, at 324-25 (a party alleging fraud must prove
it); C. MCCORMICK, supra note 15, at 950; 1 S. PHILLIPS & T. ARNOLD, supra note 38, at 81213; see Alabama By Products Corp. v. Killingsworth, 733 F.2d 1511, 1514 (11th Cir. 1984);
Sharp v. Coopers & Lybrand, 649 F.2d 175, 188 (3d Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 938
(1982); Old Ben Coal Corp. v. Interior Bd. of Mine Operations Appeals, 523 F.2d 25, 36 (7th
Cir. 1975); Denning Warehouse Co. v. Widener, 172 F.2d 910, 913 (10th Cir. 1949); Paul v.
Ribicoff, 206 F. Supp. 606, 610 (D. Colo. 1962).
53. E.g., Arthur v. Unkart, 96 U.S. 118, 122 (1877) (party alleging illegality in contract
has burden of proof).
54. Cleary, Presumingand Pleading: An Essay on Juristic Immaturity, 12 STAN. L. REV.
5, 11 (1959); see, e.g., Central Vermont Ry. v. White, 238 U.S. 507, 512 (1915); Hoffman v.
Palmer, 129 F.2d 976, 998 (1942).
55. F. JAMES & G. HAZARD, supra note 15, at 324; C. MCCORMICK, supra note 15, at
950-51; see Caulfield v. AC & D Marine Inc., 633 F.2d 1129, 1135 (5th Cir. 1981) (citing C.
MCCORMICK, THE LAW OF EVIDENCE

786-87 (E. Cleary 2d ed. 1972)).
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this principle, courts make a judicial estimate of the probabilities as to an
outcome and accordingly assign the burden of proof to the party alleging
the least-likely scenario.5 6 The probabilities may relate to the type of
situation from which the litigation arises or they may relate to the type of
litigation itself. For example, assuming that most people pay their bills,
the probabilities are that any bill selected at random has been paid; therefore, a plaintiff suing to collect a bill would bear the burden of proof as to
nonpayment. If, however, attention is limited to bills upon which suit is
brought, a contrary conclusion is reached because people are not prone

to sue for paid bills. Therefore, the party alleging payment would bear
57
the burden of proof.

(5)

The Burden of Proofis Assigned to the Party with ParticularKnowledge
About a Matter at Issue

The party who has the easiest access to evidence is most likely to
bear the burden of proof.5 8 Examples are the burdens to prove inability

to work commonly placed upon those alleging disability, and upon those

59
having records who are sued concerning matters within the records.
The rule placing the burden of proof on the party with particular knowledge of a matter appears to have considerable merit simply because such

a party is plainly in the better position to meet its burden.60 It has been
noted, however, that this consideration should not be overemphasized
because one must often plead and prove matters even though the adver56. Cleary, supra note 54, at 12-13; see, e.g., Johnson v. Johnson, 111 A.2d 820 (N.H.
1955) (plaintiff, daughter, must overcome presumption that housework done for defendant,
mother, was gratuitous); In re Smith's Estate, 213 P.2d 284, 287 (Okla. 1949) (when plaintiff
claimed remuneration for the years of housework, court assigned defendant burden of proving
that such work was gratuitous).
57. Cleary, supra note 54, at 13.
58. C. CHAMBERLAYNE, supra note 17, at 1154; B. JONES, supra note 33, at 882; C.
MCCORMICK, supra note 15, at 950; 9 J. WIGMORE, supra note 15, at 290; see Selma R. & D.R.
v. United States, 139 U.S. 560, 568 (1891) (burden of proof on party in possession of relevant
books of account); United States v. Continental Ins. Co., 776 F.2d 962, 964 (11 th Cir. 1985)
(burden of proof on party who performed relevant work); Lindahl v. Office of Personnel Management, 776 F.2d 276, 280 (9th Cir. 1985) (party with disability has burden of proof on issue
of inability to work); Fleming v. Harrison, 162 F.2d 789, 792 (8th Cir. 1947) (burden of proof
on defendant seller who had knowledge of relevant sales); Trans-American Van Serv., Inc. v.
United States, 421 F. Supp. 308, 331 (N.D. Tex. 1976) (burden lies with the knowledgeable
party).
59. Lindahl, 776 F.2d at 280; Harrison, 162 F.2d at 792.
60. Browzin v. Catholic Univ. of Am., 527 F.2d 843, 849 (D.C. Cir. 1975) (burden of
proof placed not on plaintiff but on party with knowledge); Jackson v. Green, 700 S.W.2d 620,
621 (Tex. App. 1985) (to the same effect).
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sary has more information concerning them.6 ' This view merely reflects
the general reluctance to elevate any one allocation rule over another. 62
(6)

Allocation of the Burden of Proofby Statutory Construction

Most statutes that create a cause of action do not address how the
burden of proof should be allocated. In such cases, a court may rely on
the wording of the statute to determine which party should bear the burden. Where an exception to a statute appears in the enacting clause, the
party relying on the statute to establish a cause of action or defense must
prove facts showing that his case does not come within the exception. 6 3
Where an exception or exemption appears in a different section or clause,
however, the party relying on the statute need not prove that his case is
not within the exception and therefore the burden of proof on the issue is
64
upon the opposing party.
This practice has been criticized on the basis that legislators do not
always enact statutes with burden of proof allocations in mind. 65 Consequently, a burden may be placed on a party that might be inappropriate
when one considers the legislature's statutory scheme as a whole.
D.

Application of Allocation Rules

In many cases the application of the allocation rules discussed above
consistently places the burden of proof on one party. 66 Despite the exist61. F. JAMES & G. HAZARD, supra note 15, at 324; C. MCCORMICK, supra note 15, at
950.
62. See infra text accompanying notes 66-69.
63. Rhymer v. Federal Life Ins. Co., 13 F. Supp. 181, 183 (E.D. Ky. 1936), aff'd, 95 F.2d
999 (6th Cir. 1938); Sullivan v. Ward, 304 Mass. 614, 615, 24 N.E. 2d 672, 673 (1939); see
United States v. Vuitch, 402 U.S. 62, 70 (1971); State v. Williamson, 206 N.W.2d 613, 618
(1973).
64. Schlemmer v. Buffalo, R. & P. Ry., 205 U.S. 1, 10 (1906); Greyhound Corp. v.
Leadman, 112 F. Supp. 237, 239 (D.C. Ky. 1953).
65. Cleary, supra note 54, at 9. Cleary illustrates his point with this Massachusetts
statute:
If any dog shall do any damage to either the body or property of any person, the
owner... shall be liable for such damage, unless such damage shall have been occasioned to the body or property of a person who, at the time such damage was sustained, was committing a trespass or other tort, or was teasing, tormenting or
abusing such dog.
MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 140, § 155 (Law. Co-op. 1950).
This statute was construed as imposing on a two year old plaintiff the burden of establishing that he was not teasing, tormenting or abusing the dog. Sullivan v. Ward, 304 Mass. 614,
24 N.E.2d 672 (1939) (cited in Cleary, supra note 54, at 9).
66. For example, in Arthur v. Unkart, 96 U.S. 118 (1877), the Supreme Court placed the
burden of proof on the plaintiff, who was also observed to allege the affirmative of an issue that
alleged a disfavored contention. Id. at 122.
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ence of these easily resolved cases, cases do arise in which the application
of the rules to a particular case lead to divergent results. 67 While the
possibility of such a conflict should have led to an ordering of rules so
that one takes precedence over another, no such ordering has occurred.
Many authorities, including Professor McCormick, conclude that there
is no overriding principle governing the apportionment of the burdens of
proof because the ultimate allocation depends on general considerations
of fairness, convenience, and policy. 68 While the authorities do not suggest that these considerations conflict with the desired goals of certainty
and clarity, some uncertainty and confusion necessarily follow if an allocation of the burden of proof rests on not one but several principles, none
69
of which have primacy over any other.
IH. The Burden of Proof in Tax Cases
The courts' seeming indifference to articulating a policy-based rationale for allocating the burden of proof appears to be merely a matter
of historical curiosity. This serendipitous tendency has been curbed
somewhat in cases involving the tax collector because of the importance
of the burden of proof in tax collection. Before proceeding, a brief overview of the tax litigation procedure will aid understanding of the role
played by the burden of proof.
A.

Federal Tax Procedure: A Primer

Tax trials can take place in three forums: the Claims Court, the
federal district courts, and the Tax Court. A taxpayer effectively makes
the decision regarding the choice of forum. A taxpayer can, therefore,
engage in creative forum shopping based on a number of
67. E.g., Mashpee Tribe v. New Seabury Corp., 592 F.2d 575, 589-90 (1st Cir. 1979)
(burden of proof on party making affirmative allegation but other factors may override), cert.
denied, 444 U.S. 866 (1980); Fleming v. Harrison, 162 F.2d 789, 792 (8th Cir. 1947) (burden of
proof not on plaintiff but on party with knowledge); Jackson v. Green, 700 S.W.2d 620, 621
(Tex. App. 1985) (burden of proof on party with particular knowledge not plaintiff).
68. F. JAMES & G. HAZARD, supra note 15, at 322; C. MCCORMICK, supra note 15, at
952; E. MORGAN, BASIC PROBLEMS OF EVIDENCE 28 (1962); 9 J. WIGMORE, supra note 15, at
291-92.
69. The concept that the need for some play in the joints of the system serves to introduce
necessary flexibility is accepted by most. F. JAMES & G. HAZARD, supra note 15, at 322; C.
MCCORMICK, supra note 15, at 952; E. MORGAN, supra note 68, at 28; 9 J. WIGMORE, supra
note 15, at 291. For some, however, this flexibility may introduce into the dispute resolution
system an unnecessary amount of judicial discretion which may influence the outcome. See
Kennedy, Freedom and Constraint in Adjudication: A CriticalPhenomenology, 36 J. LEGAL
EDUC. 518 (1986).
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70

considerations.
A taxpayer against whom a federal tax deficiency is assessed can
pursue one of two different courses of action.7 1 First, the taxpayer may
contest the deficiency by filing a petition in the Tax Court without actually paying the tax asserted to be due. 72 Alternatively, the taxpayer can
pay the tax due and then elect to sue the United States for a refund in
either the Claims Court or in the appropriate federal district court. 73 As
will be discussed in the following sections, the choice of forum will also
74
affect the extent of the burden of proof and the risk of nonpersuasion.
70. These considerations may include the availability of a jury trial, the existence of
favorable or unfavorable case law as precedent, the actual payment of the tax, and the degree
of informality regarding pretrial procedures. M. GARBIS, P. JUNGHANS & S. STRUNTZ, FEDERAL TAX LITIGATION,
2.01-2.07, at 2-1 to 2-17 (1985); M. SALTZMAN, IRS PRACTICE AND
PROCEDURE 1 9.04[2], at 9-18 to 9-22 (1981); Whitfield & McCallum, Burden of Proof and
Choice of Forum in Tax Litigation, 20 VAND. L. REV. 1179, 1179-82 (1967).
71. The term "deficiency" is a term of art and refers to the amount by which the correct
tax imposed by the Internal Revenue Code exceeds the tax reported on the taxpayer's return.
I.R.C. § 621 l(a) (1980 & Supp. 1987); see M. SALTZMAN, supra note 70, 10.0311], at 10-9 to
10-10.
72. The jurisdictional prerequisite for the Tax Court is the statutory notice of deficiency
issued by the IRS. I.R.C. §§ 6212, 6213 (Supp. 1987); see I.R.C. § 7442 (Supp. 1987). Taxpayers are then given 90 days (150 days if the notice of deficiency is mailed outside the United
States) within which to file a petition in the Tax Court for redetermination of the deficiency.
I.R.C. § 6213(a) (Supp. 1987). The taxpayer can avoid payment because collection or levy of
the tax is suspended during the 90 or 150 day period, or if a Tax Court petition is filed within
the specified period, until such time as the Tax Court decision becomes final. I.R.C. § 6213(a)
(Supp. 1987). A Tax Court decision becomes final when the statutory time allowed for appeal
of 90 days expires. I.R.C. §§ 7481, 7483 (Supp. 1987). A detailed discussion of the process is
contained in Scar v. Commissioner, 814 F.2d 1363 (9th Cir. 1987).
73. The federal district courts and the Claims Court are given concurrent jurisdiction
over suits for refund. 28 U.S.C. § 1346(a)(1) (Supp. 1987); Triangle Corp. v. United States, 597
F. Supp. 507, 508 (D. Conn. 1984). A prior overpayment of tax also may give rise to a refund
action. I.R.C. § 6401 (Supp. 1987). The suit for refund requires that a prior administrative
claim be made for the refund. I.R.C. §§ 6502(a), 7422(a) (Supp. 1987). A taxpayer may well
be forced into the Claims Court or the appropriate federal district court if the jurisdictional
prerequisites to Tax Court jurisdiction are not met. This might occur when the taxpayer fails
to file a timely Tax Court petition or if no statutory notice of deficiency has been issued by the
IRS. Curry v. United States, 774 F.2d 852, 854-55 (7th Cir. 1985); I.R.C. § 6213(a) (Supp.
1987).
If a taxpayer institutes a suit for refund, he may yet file in the Tax Court provided the
petition is timely. I.R.C.§ 7422(e) (Supp. 1987). On the other hand, a petition filed in the Tax
Court cannot later be withdrawn. I.R.C. § 6512(a) (Supp. 1987). Upon filing the Tax Court
petition the taxpayer relinquishes all other judicial remedies except the right to appeal the Tax
Court's decision. Estate of Ming v. Commissioner, 62 T.C. 519 (1974).
The primary disadvantage to the refund action is that full payment of the tax asserted to
be due must be made or the claim fails. Curry v. United States, 774 F.2d 852, 854-55 (7th Cir.
1985) (full payment is jurisdictional prerequisite despite severe hardship on taxpayer); Flora v.
United States, 362 U.S. 145, 177 (1960).
74. See infra text accompanying notes 75-113. Conversely, the extent of the burden of
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B. The Taxpayer's Burden of Proof
Generally, the taxpayer has the burden of proof in any tax controversy, but the extent of the burden differs according to the forum. In Tax
Court, the petitioner must demonstrate that the commissioner's assessment is incorrect. 75 In a refund action, the taxpayer has a significantly
higher burden-the taxpayer must not only prove the assessment is in76
correct, but also must establish the amount to which she is entitled.
The development of this disparate treatment can be traced in part to the
establishment of the Tax Court and its predecessor, the Board of Tax
Appeals, as well as to the application of the common-law burden of proof
77
allocation rules in the federal courts.
(1)

Presumption of Correctness

As with civil cases in general, a number of factors have influenced
the allocation of the burden of proof in tax cases. Before the allocation
can be discussed meaningfully, an understanding of the preliminaries is
required. A significant factor adding to the taxpayer's burden in both
Tax Court and refund suits is the presumption of correctness which attaches to the IRS Commissioner's assessments or determinations of deficiency. 78 The commissioner's determinations of tax deficiencies are
presumptively correct. 79 Although the presumption is not evidence in
itself, the presumption remains until the taxpayer produces competent
and relevant evidence to support his position. 80 If the taxpayer comes
forward with such evidence, the presumption vanishes and the case must
be decided upon the evidence presented, with the burden of proof on the
proof among the various forums may affect the initial choice of forum. Whitfield & McCallum,
supra note 70, at 1179.
75. Helvering v. Taylor, 293 U.S. 507, 515 (1934); Welch v. Helvering, 290 U.S. 111, 115
(1933).
76. Taylor, 293 U.S. at 514-15; Lewis v. Reynolds, 284 U.S. 281, 283 (1932); Compton v.
United States, 334 F.2d 212, 216 (4th Cir. 1964); Forbes v. Hassett, 124 F.2d 925, 928 (Ist Cir.
1942); see F. BURNETT & G. KAFKA, LITIGATION OF FEDERAL TAX CONTROVERSIES 15-2

(1986). The burden may extend to the exercise of constitutional rights. For example, in
United States v. Neff, 615 F.2d 1235, 1240 (9th Cir.), cert denied, 447 U.S. 925 (1980), the
court held that in order to exercise the privilege against self-incrimination, a taxpayer had the
burden of showing that answers given in the course of examination might tend to incriminate
unless the circumstances and questions were inherently incriminating.
77. See infra notes 86-98 and accompanying text.
78. Welch, 290 U.S. at 115; Niles Bement Pond Co. v. United States, 281 U.S. 357, 361
(1929); Cohen v. Commissioner, 266 F.2d 5, 11 (9th Cir. 1959); Dairy Home Co. v. United
States, 180 F. Supp. 92, 95 (1960).
79. Welch, 290 U.S. at 115; Niles Bement Pond, 281 U.S. at 361; Barnes v. Commissioner, 408 F.2d 65, 68 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 836 (1969).
80. A & A Tool & Supply Co. v. Commissioner, 182 F.2d 300, 304 (10th Cir. 1950).
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8
taxpayer. 1

A number of courts have interpreted the successful rebuttal of the
commissioner's presumption of correctness as shifting the burden of
proof to the IRS.8 2 This suggestion is squarely inconsistent with the
83
well-developed rules imposing the burden of proof on the taxpayer.
One explanation for this seeming departure may be confusion regarding
the two-fold definition of the burden of proof.8 4 While a successful rebuttal to the commissioner's presumption may shift the burden of production to the IRS, the burden of proof does not shift and remains with
85
the taxpayer.
(2)

The Burden of Proof in the Tax Court

The Board of Tax Appeals, the immediate predecessor of the present-day Tax Court, was created pursuant to the Revenue Act of 1924.86
A significant motivation for the creation of the Board was to provide
taxpayers a forum in which to contest an assessed tax liability without
first having to pay the tax asserted to be due.8 7 The Revenue Act of 1924
81. Barnes, 408 F.2d at 69; Compton v. United States, 334 F.2d 212, 216 (4th Cir. 1964);
A & A Tool & Supply, 182 F.2d at 304.
82. See, e.g., Sharwell v. Commissioner, 419 F.2d 1057, 1060 (6th Cir. 1969) (burden of
proof shifts to commissioner once taxpayer has successfully rebutted presumption of correctness); Cohen, 266 F.2d at 11 (burden of proof shifts to commissioner once taxpayer shows
commissioner's original determination is invalid); United States v. Florida, 252 F. Supp. 806,
811 (E.D. Ark. 1965) (burden of proof shifts to commissioner once taxpayer overcomes presumption of validity of the assessment). In United States v. Russell Mfg. Co., 349 F.2d 13, 16
(2d Cir. 1965), the Second Circuit went so far as to say that the government can prevail in a
collection suit "only by showing an affirmative ground that will move the conscience of the
court."
83. See infra notes 86-113 and accompanying text.
84. See supra notes 29-33 and accompanying text.
85. See United States v. Rexach, 482 F.2d 10, 16 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1039
(1973); United Aniline Co. v. Commissioner, 316 F.2d 701, 704 (1st Cir. 1963); Piper & Jerge,
Shifting the Burden of Proofin Tax Court, 31 TAX LAW. 303, 313 & n.47 (1978).
The source of confusion may be based on the idea that if a taxpayer successfully shows
commissioner's determination to be arbitrary or wholly without foundation, the taxpayer will
prevail. Helvering v. Taylor, 293 U.S. 507, 514 (1935). This development, however, may mean
that by such a showing the taxpayer has met not only the burden of production but also the
burden of proof. F. BURNETT & G. KAFKA, supra note 76, at 15-2; Piper & Jerge, supra, at
313 & n.47.
86. Revenue Act of 1924, ch. 234, § 900, 43 Stat. 253, 337 (1924); see Flora v. United
States, 362 U.S. 145, 158-63 (1960); F. BURNETT & G. KAFKA, supra note 76, at 1-3 n.ll;
Dubroff, The United States Tax Court: An HistoricalAnalysis, 40 ALB. L. REV. 7 (1975).
87. Flora, 362 U.S. at 163; H. R. REP. No. 179, 68th Cong., 1st Sess. 7-8 (1924), reprinted in J. SEIDMAN, SEIDMAN'S LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF FEDERAL INCOME TAX LAWS,
1938-1861, at 759-60 (1938); Dubroff, supra note 86, at 39. The Board of Tax Appeals, in its
second docketed and decided case recognized this important aspect of its existence, i.e., the
mitigation of the congressionally disfavored "pay first, litigate later" aspect characterizing
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expressly left to the Board's discretion the promulgation of rules governing both practice and procedure. 88 With this grant of authority the
Board placed the burden of proof on the taxpayer in its rule 20.89 While
the burden has remained with the taxpayer, the burden was eased by the
Revenue Act of 1928, which shifted the burden of proof in fraud cases to
the government. 90
The Tax Court succeeded the Board of Tax Appeals pursuant to the
Revenue Act of 1942.91 Like its predecessor, the Tax Court was given
wide latitude to make rules regarding trial procedures. 92 In 1969, the
Congress removed the Tax Court from the executive branch and the
court now derives its authority from article I of the Constitution. 93 The
Tax Court shortly thereafter adopted the present rule placing the burden
early tax litigation. In re Everett Knitting Works, I B.T.A. 5, 6 (1924). Moreover, the Board
was quick to state that while it was a part of the executive branch, it remained independent

from the then Internal Revenue Bureau. In re J.M. Lyon, 1 B.T.A. 378, 379 (1924).
88. Revenue Act of 1924, ch. 234, § 900(h), 43 Stat. 253, 337 (1924).
89. See Notice 111-30-19692, 111-2 C.B. 425, 431 (1924). B.T.A. Rule 20 states, "Upon
hearing of appeals the taxpayer shall open and close and the burden of proof shall be upon
him."
Hearings conducted prior to the Revenue Act of 1928 suggested that no one had seriously
questioned the allocation of the burden of proof to the taxpayer. An Act to Reduce andEqualize Taxation, ProvideRevenue, andfor other Purposes,1928: Hearings on Revenue Act of 1928,
H.R. 1, Comm. on Finance,70th Cong., 1st Sess. 24-25 (1928) [hereinafter Senate Hearings].

Opposition to the rule surfaced in 1925 in hearings before the House of Representatives. Hearings on Revenue Revision, 1925,Before the House Comm. on Ways andMeans, 69th Cong., Ist.
Sess. 877 (1925) [hereinafter House Hearings]. A witness representing the American Institute
of Accountants favored shifting the burden to the government arguing that "there is no reason
why the right of the taxpayer should be sacrificed to the convenience of the commissioner,"
and that placing the burden on the taxpayer was "contrary to the rule that obtains in any court
outside of France." Id. Notwithstanding this argument, at the 1928 hearings satisfaction was
expressed with the workability of the rule during its infancy. Senate Hearings,supra, at 523.
90. Revenue Act of 1928, ch. 852, § 601, 45 Stat. 791, 872 (1928). At hearings before the
Senate Finance Committee on the Revenue Act of 1928, a witness representing the American
Bar Association argued that placing the burden of proof on the taxpayer in fraud cases contradicted, "the ordinary principles of Anglo-Saxon and American jurisprudence." Senate Hearings, supra note 89, at 25.
91. Revenue Act of 1942, ch. 619, § 504(a), 56 Stat. 957 (1942). The term "succeeded" is
somewhat inapt in that the statute merely provided for a change of name from the Board of
Tax Appeals to "The Tax Court of the United States." Id.
92. Revenue Act of 1942, ch. 619, § 504(b), 56 Stat. 798, 957 (1942) provided that the
powers, duties, rights, and privileges of the Tax Court were to be the same as existing by law
provided for the Board of Tax Appeals. One case suggested that the Board of Tax Appeals
exceeded its authority in enacting the general burden of proof rule. In Budd v. Commissioner,
43 F.2d 509 (3d Cir. 1930), the Third Circuit noted that the board only had legislative grant of
authority to promulgate rules of practice and was without power to prescribe rules of evidence.
Id. Although the Tax Court's authority has not been enlarged or otherwise changed, the Budd
case apparently has not been followed. See I.R.C. § 7453 (1986) (describing Tax Court's authority to promulgate rules of practice and procedure other than rules of evidence).
93. Tax Reform Act of 1969, § 951, Pub. L. 91-172, 83 Stat. 730. The name of the court
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of proof on taxpayers. 94 As currently in effect, Tax Court Rule 142(a)
reads in pertinent part: "The burden of proof shall be upon the petitioner, except as otherwise provided by statute or determined by the
Court. ....

-95

The rule's allocation of the burden of proof to the taxpayer has occasionally been challenged on constitutional grounds. For example, in
Rockwell v. Commissioner,the taxpayer argued that it was a denial of due

96
process for the Tax Court to force him to bear the burden of proof.

The Ninth Circuit rejected the taxpayer's claim as "frivolous," observing

that Congress could condition the taxpayer's right to contest tax assessments almost without limitation. 97 The court expressly noted that if the
allocation of the burden of proof to the taxpayer was constitutionally
suspect, the United States Supreme Court would have long ago overturned the practice. 98
(3)

Refund Suits

Taxpayers' right to obtain refunds of federal taxes in federal courts
originated with suits against tax collectors. 99 The United States Supreme

Court in 1836 "recognized the existence of a right of action against a
Collector of Customs for a refund of duties illegally assessed and paid
under protest.'' 1 This right of action was based on the common-law

count for money had and received. 10 ' Suits against collectors initiated
the development of an arcane tax refund procedure, which few under-

stood and often caused taxpayers difficulty when the wrong collector was
sued. 10 2 Only with the creation of the Court of Claims in 1855 did realso was changed to the United States Tax Court. See S. REP. 91, No.552, 91st Cong., 1st Sess.
304 (1969).
94. The United States Tax Court adopted rules of practice and procedure which became
effective January 1, 1974. Rule 142(a) is derived from former Rule 32 which in turn was
preceded by Rule 20. 60 T.C. 1057, 1133 (1973).
95. 60 T.C. 1057, 1133 (1973).
96. Rockwell v. Commissioner, 512 F.2d 882, 887 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1015
(1975).
97. Id.
98. Id. The constitutionality of allocating the burden of proof to the taxpayer appears to
remain well settled. May v. Commissioner, 752 F.2d 1301, 1304 n.2 (8th Cir. 1985); McCoy v.
Commissioner, 696 F.2d 1234, 1236-37 (9th Cir. 1983).
99. See Flora v. United States, 362 U.S. 145, 185-98 (1960) (Whittaker, J., dissenting)
(citing Plumb, Tax Refund Suits Against Collectors of Internal Revenue, 60 HARV. L. REV.
685, 688-89 (1947)).
100. Flora, 362 U.S. at 185-86 (Whittaker, J., dissenting); Elliott v. Swartwout, 35 U.S. (10
Pet.) 137 (1836).
101. Elliott, 35 U.S. at 156-58.
102. Act of Feb. 24, 1855, ch. 122. 10 Stat. 612; Dubroff, supra note 86, at 39; Plumb,
supra note 99, at 687-93.
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fund suits directly against the United States first became theoretically
possible. 10 3 The theory did not find favor with the Supreme Court,
which in 1868 held that cases arising under the revenue laws were not
within the jurisdiction of the Court of Claims. 104 The Supreme Court
later held the Court of Claims had jurisdiction over claims for tax refunds based, not on the earlier statute, but on legislation enacted in
1866.105 Not until 1887 were refund suits allowed in the district
0 6

courts. 1

The common-law heritage of the refund suit explains the origin of
the rule allocating the burden of proof to the taxpayer. As noted above,
the allocation of the burden of proof in tax refund cases arose from judicial reliance on actions involving the common-law count for money had
and received.' 0 7 At common law, a right of action for indebitatus assumpsit allowed a plaintiff to allege that a defendant was indebted to her
for a certain sum. 10 8 Indebitatus assumpsit in turn encompassed the
common-law count for money had and received under which an action
would lie for money received (as opposed to services or goods received)
by the defendant for the use of the plaintiff. 0 9
The idea that the statutory basis for tax refund suits was predicated
on the same principles underlying actions in assumpsit for money had
and received found early expression in tax refund cases."10 Because the
103. The Act established a Court of Claims to hear claims founded upon any law of Congress, regulation of the executive branch, or upon any contract with the United States. If the
court reached a decision favorable to a claimant, both its decision and a bill were submitted to
Congress for approval. 2 W. COWEN, P. NICHOLS, JR. & M. BENNETT, THE UNITED STATES
COURT OF CLAIMS, A HISTORY 1855-1978, at 15-18 (1978).
104. Nichols v. United States, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 122, 129-31 (1868); see 2 W. COWEN, P.
NICHOLS, JR. & M. BENNETT, supra note 103, at 43-44.

105. United States v. Savings Bank, 104 U.S. 728, 732-34 (1881); see United States v.
Kaufman, 96 U.S. 567, 569-70 (1877); T. COOLEY, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF TAXATION
1396-99 (1903). On October 1, 1982, the United States Claims Court replaced the Court of
Claims and accepted as binding precedent all published decisions of the former Court of
Claims. Federal Courts Improvement Act, Pub. L. No. 97-164, 96 Stat. 25 (1982). See generally Betts, ForegoneBut Not Forgotten;Interest Free Loans, 11 N. Ky. L. REV. 373, 375 n. 14
(1984); DiStefano, FederalIncome Tax-CharitableContributions, 15 U. BALT. L. REV. 604,
n.3 (1986).
106. Act of Mar. 3, 1887, ch. 359, 24 Stat. 505. The Act gave the United States District
Courts concurrent jurisdiction with the Court of Claims on any claim not exceeding $1,000.
107. Stone v. White, 301 U.S. 532, 534-35 (1937); Lewis v. Reynolds, 284 U.S. 281, 283
(1932).
108. J. KOFFLER & A. REPPY, HANDBOOK OF COMMON-LAW PLEADING § 176, at 350
(1969); B. SHIPMAN, HANDBOOK OF COMMON-LAW PLEADING § 61, at 161 (3d ed. H. Ballantine rev. 1923).
109. B. SHIPMAN, supra note 108, at 162-64; J. KOFFLER & A. REPPY, supra note 108, at
351-53.
110. Stone, 301 U.S. at 535; United States v. Jefferson Elec. Co., 291 U.S. 386, 402 (1934).
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common law traditionally placed the burden of proof in such cases on the
person making a claim of funds held by another, " 'I placing the burden of
proof on the taxpayer was a natural consequence. A notion implicit in
such allocation is that the taxpayer has voluntarily paid the tax to the
government-accordingly in a refund suit the taxpayer should bear the
burden of explaining her seemingly inconsistent conduct in requesting
1 12
the return of the voluntarily paid sums.

As it developed, the burden of proof placed on the taxpayer in refund suits took on a two-part obligation. First, the taxpayer was required to show that an assessment was wrong and second, based on the
common-law count for money had and received, the taxpayer was required to show the correct amount to which she was entitled." 13 This
formulation of the burden of proof obligation of the taxpayer now is the
general rule that governs all refund suits.
(4)

Tax Collection Suits

Another possible action arises from the Internal Revenue Code itself. A taxpayer may choose to do nothing at all in response to an IRS
notice of deficiency. In such cases, the government can bring an action
114
to enforce the payment of the tax in a so-called "tax collection suit.'
While the United States Supreme Court has not spoken directly to the
burden of proof in these tax collection cases, the Court has suggested that
the policy behind the tax collection suits and its cousin, the taxpayer's
tax refund suit, are the same." t5 This result is appropriate. First, nothing in the nature of the tax collection suits mandates different treatment.
111. Atlantic Coast R.R. v. Florida, 295 U.S. 301, 109-10 (1934); United States v. American Packing & Provision Co., 122 F.2d 445, 449 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 314 U.S. 694 (1941).
112. See Elliott v. Swartwout, 35 U.S. (10 Pet.) 137, 153-56 (1836); Bull v. United States,
295 U.S. 247, 295-60 (1935); Taylor v. Commissioner, 70 F.2d 619, 620 (2d Cir.) (L. Hand, J.),
aff'd sub nom. Helvering v. Taylor, 293 U.S. 507 (1934).
113. United States v. Janis, 428 U.S. 433, 440 (1976); Helvering v. Taylor, 293 U.S. 507,
514-15 (1934); Lewis v. Reynolds, 284 U.S. 281, 283 (1932); Compton v. United States, 334
F.2d 212, 216 (4th Cir. 1964). See infra note 142.
114. I.R.C. §§ 7401, 7403 (West 1987); M. SALTZMAN, supra note 70, at
14-45 to 1451.
115. United States v. Janis, 428 U.S. 433, 440 (1976). But see Bar L Ranch, Inc. v. Phinney, 426 F.2d 995, 998-99 (5th Cir. 1970). In the Bar L Ranch case, the Fifth Circuit concluded that the taxpayer's inaction in such cases warranted different treatment, holding that
the taxpayer need only show that an assessment is arbitrary and that the burden of proof
would then be on the government to show the existence and the amount of any deficiency. Id.
The United States Supreme Court in Janis did not reach this conclusion because it held that an
assessment founded upon evidence excluded on constitutional grounds from a state criminal
trial was nonetheless competent in a civil tax case. Therefore, according to the Janis Court,
the assessment was not arbitrary and was not within the Taylor rule. Janis,428 U.S. at 441-42.
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While the United States is the initiator of the action, the taxpayer's inaction or failure to respond at all to the notice of the deficiency should not
accord the taxpayer better treatment than one who elects to pay the tax
and sues for refund. Second, if the goal of the tax collection system is
efficiency and fairness, placing the burden of proof on the taxpayer advances this goal.
C. Restrictions on the Burden of Proof Rule
Despite the wide reach of the general burden of proof rule, there
exist a number of situations in which the commissioner has the burden of
proof on certain issues in the Tax Court and in suits for refunds. The
discussion that follows describes the major areas in which the IRS bears
11 6
the burden of proof.
(1) Cases Involving Fraud
Section 7454 of the Internal Revenue Code provides that in any proceeding, the commissioner must prove issues involving fraud committed
by a petitioner. 11 7 In addition to this statutory burden of proof provision, the Tax Court Rules also place the burden of proof on the commissioner on the issue of fraud."1
Because section 7454 refers not to "taxpayers" but specifically to
"petitioners," it may be tempting to restrict its application to cases involving taxpayers' Tax Court litigation. Despite this possible and reasonable interpretation restricting the reach of the statute, the courts either
have ignored the distinction or reached the same result by relying on the
common law without reference to the statute. 1 9 The few courts that
have considered the distinction conclude that the policy behind the statute (i.e., that the party alleging fraud should bear the burden of proof)
116. There are a number of other situations which arise under the revenue laws in which
the burden of proof is allocated to the IRS. E.g., Traxler v. Commissioner, 61 T.C. 97, 100
(1973), modified, 63 T.C. 534 (1975) (commissioner bears burden of proof of mailing notices of
deficiency); I.R.C. § 6703(a) (1987) (commissioner bears burden of proof for certain penalties).
117. I.R.C. § 7454(a) (1987).
118. Tax Court Rule 142(b), 60 T.C. 1057, 1133 (1973). The commissioner's burden of
proof extends only to fraud issues and does not include other issues which may be raised in a
particular case. Howell v. Commissioner, 10 T.C. 859, 865 (1948), aff'd, 175 F.2d 240 (6th
Cir. 1949).
119. Many cases simply rely on the common law to place the burden of proof on the
United States. E.g., Considine v. United States, 683 F.2d 1285, 1286 n.1 (9th Cir. 1985);
Loftin & Woodward Inc. v. United States, 577 F.2d 1206, 1236 (5th Cir. 1978); Maroois v.
Smyth, 187 F.2d 228, 232 (9th Cir. 1951); Duffin v. Lucas, 55 F.2d 786, 798 (6th Cir. 1932).
At least one case has relied on the statute without appreciation of the ambiguous application.
Coats v. United States, 258 F. Supp. 1, 5 (E.D. Tex. 1966).
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does not change by reason of the fact that the case lies not in the Tax
Court but involves a suit for refund against the United States.' 20
A related provision requires that the IRS bear the burden of proof
with respect to whether a payment made by a taxpayer constitutes an
illegal bribe or kickback. 1 2 ' The Internal Revenue Code expressly makes
such payment not deductible even if made in connection with the active
122
conduct of a trade or business.

(2)

Cases Involving Wrongdoing by Foundation Managers

The commissioner bears the burden of proof in matters alleging
wrongdoing by foundation managers. 2 3 The Tax Court has a similar
rule.' 24 The conduct involved in these cases sounds in fraud and results
in special sanctions. For example, the provisions governing private foundations in the Internal Revenue Code impose a series of special taxes on
each act of "self-dealing" between a "disqualified person" and a private
foundation.12 5 Acts of self-dealing under the Code include sales, exchanges or leasing transactions between disqualified persons and a private foundation as well as the transfer of assets to a disqualified person
from a private foundation. 2 6 The term "disqualified person" (generally
defined as officers, directors, trustees, or other persons of authority with
respect to a given foundation) includes foundation managers and other
27
persons or entities having substantial interests in a private foundation.1
Thus, the charter of an airplane by a foundation manager or other disqualified person is considered by the IRS to be a prohibited self-dealing.' 28 Similarly, the possession by a foundation manager or other
disqualified person of paintings owned by a private foundation is a pro129
hibited act of self-dealing to which the special tax may apply.
120. Paddock v. United States, 280 F.2d 563, 567-68 (2d Cir. 1960) (Friendly, J.); Carter
v. Cambell, 264 F.2d 930, 937-38 (5th Cir. 1959); Trainer v. United States, 145 F. Supp. 786,
787 (E.D. Pa. 1956); see Lee v. United States, 466 F.2d 11, 14 (5th Cir. 1972).
121. I.R.C. § 162(c) (1987). Included are payments made unlawful under the Foreign
Corrupt Practices Act, payments which subject the payor to criminal sanction or loss of license, and payments which result in remuneration under the Social Security Medicare and
Medicaid programs. Id.
122. Id.
123. Id. § 7454(b).
124. Tax Court Rule 142(c), 60 T.C. 1057, 1133 (1973).
125. I.R.C. § 4941 (a) (1986).
126. Id. § 4941 (d).
127. Id. §§ 4946 (a), 4946 (b).
128. Rev. Rul. 73-363, 1973-2 C.B. 383.
129. Rev. Rul. 74-600, 1974-2 C.B. 385.
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(3) Affirmative Defenses and Counterclaims

In the Tax Court, the IRS bears the burden of proof with respect to
affirmative defenses, new matters asserted, or increases in deficiencies it
might assert. 130 Similarly, the United States bears the burden of proof on
all affirmative defenses raised in suits for refund. 3 1 The decisions of the
courts of appeals conflict regarding the burden of proof on new issues

raised in suits for refund. One line of cases holds that the burden of
proof remains with the taxpayer, reasoning that if a new matter presents
undue hardship to the taxpayer, the trial court can elect to continue the
case. 132 The other line of cases holds that the burden of proof with respect to new matters lies with the government, although the courts do
not advance a theory on the point.133
In suits for refund in the district courts, the burden of proof remains
with the taxpayer on counterclaims asserted by the government. 134 This
inconsistency may be partially explained by the common practice of seeking refunds for divisible taxes (for example, excise taxes) by paying only a
small part of the entire tax liability while still satisfying the full-payment
rule. In such cases, the United States is likely to counterclaim for the
part of the divisible taxes not paid. The courts have held, and the applicable statute reflects the fact, that in such cases the burden of proof rightfully remains with the taxpayer under the theory that the burden should
135
not be affected by the taxpayer's procedural ploy.
130. Tax Court Rule 142(a), 60 T.C. 1057, 1133 (1973) provides in pertinent part: "The
burden of proof shall be upon the petitioner, except as otherwise provided by statute or determined by the Court; and except that, in respect of any new matter, increases in deficiency, and
affirmative defenses, pleaded in his answer, it shall be upon the respondent." For a dated but
good discussion of the issues involving the definition of new matters, see Piper & Jerge, supra
note 85, at 305-11; see also Whitfield & McCallum, supra note 70, at 1183-87 (assessing impact
of Rule 32 of the Tax Court Rules of Practice).
131. Crosley Corp. v. United States, 229 F.2d 376, 381 (6th Cir. 1956); Powell v. United
States, 123 F.2d 472, 475 (9th Cir. 1941).
132. King v. United States, 641 F.2d 253, 259 (5th Cir. 1981); see Roybark v. United
States, 218 F.2d 164, 165-66 (9th Cir. 1954).
133. Service Life Ins. Co. v. United States, 189 F. Supp. 282, 284 (D. Neb. 1960), aff'd,
293 F.2d 72 (8th Cir. 1961); see Massingale v. United States, 3 A.F.T.R.2d 995, 996 (D. Ariz.
1959).
134. Co-Efficient Foundation v. Woods, 171 F.2d 691, 694 (5th Cir. 1949); Gilbert v. General Elec. Co., 59 F.R.D. 273, 275 (1973); I.R.C. § 7422(e) (1987).
135. Lesser v. United States, 368 F.2d 306, 310 (2d Cir. 1966); M. GARBIS, P. JUNGHANS
& S. STRUNTZ, supra note 70, at 17-27 to 17-29 (1985). There is some conflict on this point
and no reconciliation apparently has occurred. Id. at 17-29; Whitfield & McCallum, supra
note 70, at 1183-87. Some courts hold that the IRS maintains the burden of proof even in
counterclaims. See United States v. Molitor, 337 F.2d 917, 922 (9th Cir. 1964). Even these
authorities still recognize that the commissioner's determination is presumptively correct. Id.
The seeming inconsistency also stems from the fact that the counterclaim provision con-
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Transferee Liability

The Internal Revenue Code imposes liability on a certain class of
nontaxpayers broadly described as "transferees." Transferees may include persons who receive property as donees, shareholders of a dissolved
corporation, or assignees of an insolvent person. 136 Both the Internal
Revenue Code and the Tax Court Rules provide that the IRS bears the
burden of proof in cases involving transferees.' 37 The burden only extends, however, to the issue of whether the transferee is liable as a trans38
feree and not whether the original taxpayer is liable for the tax.
(5) Accumulated Earnings Tax
The IRS bears the burden of proof in the Tax Court with respect to
the reasonableness of accumulations of income subject to the accumulated earnings tax.1 39 In such situations the Internal Revenue Code requires notice to a taxpayer that the accumulated earnings tax penalty
might apply. If notice is not given, the IRS bears the burden of proof. 140
Even with notice, the statute provides a mechanism whereby the tax4
payer can return the burden of proof to the IRS.1 '

III.

Allocation of the Burden of Proof: Rationale

This section will discuss the rationale behind the current tax system's 'allocation of the burden of proof both in terms of the general princerns itself with the burden of proof on the initial assertion of tax liability by the United States.
H.R. REP. No. 1337, 83rd Cong., 2d Sess., Ch. 76, reprinted in 1954 U.S. CODE CONG. &
ADMIN. NEWS 4579; S. REP. No. 1622, 83rd Cong., 2d Sess., ch. 76, reprinted in 1954 U.S.
CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 5261; Dubroff, supra note 86, at 214-15. On the other hand,
the new matter provision of the Tax Court Rule does not address the initial assertion of deficiency but rather the assessment of an additional deficiency on a previously unchallenged item.
136. Treas. Reg. § 301.6901-1 (1961). The liability arises generally from the receipt of
property from a person who has an outstanding tax liability that may or may not be satisfied.
See M. SALTZMAN, supra note 70, at 17-1 to 17-28 for a thorough discussion of transferee
liability.
137. I.R.C. § 6902(a) (1987); Tax Court Rule 142(d), 60 T.C. 1057, 1133 (1973).
138. I.R.C. § 6902(a) (1987); see M. SALTZMAN, supra note 70, at 17-27 to 17-28.
139. I.R.C. § 534(a) (1987); Tax Court Rule 142(e), 60 T.C. 1057, 1133 (1973); see F.
BURNETT & G. KAFKA, supra note 76, at 9-3 n. 10. This shift in the burden of proof does not
appear to apply to suits for refunds because the accumulated earnings tax is in the nature of a
penalty and taxpayers would not be expected to pay the penalty in advance of its imposition.
140. I.R.C. § 534(b) (1987).
141. Id. For a general discussion of the burden of proof in these cases, see F. BURNETT &
G. KAFKA, supra note 76, at 9-3 n.10; M. GARBIS, P. JUNGHANS & S. STRUNTZ, supra note
70, at 12-10, 12-13. The statute provides that if a statement of the grounds on which the
taxpayer relied to establish the reasonableness of accumulations is submitted by the taxpayer
within 30 days of the IRS notice, the IRS bears the burden of proof. I.R.C. § 534 (a)(2)
(1987).
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ciples identified in section I and in terms of the unique requirements of
our voluntary-reporting system of taxation. Since the Tax Court developed and operates independently of the district courts and the Court of
Claims, this inquiry into why the taxpayer bears the burden of proof,
however, is actually two separate inquiries: First, why the plaintiff taxpayer in refund suits bears the burden; and second, why the Tax Court
places the burden on the taxpayer petitioner.
An additional point to be discussed is why the burden of proof, with
the exception of the restrictions discussed above, is allocated by the common law or, in the case of the Tax Court, by Tax Court Rule 142. The
fact that the Code-dominated field of taxation should depend on the common law for a keystone of its construction is counter-intuitive. This is
especially true because the exceptions to the general rule allocating the
burden of proof to the taxpayer are legislatively created, while the general rule itself is not codified.
A.

Common-Law Foundation

The authority for placing the burden of proof on the taxpayer in
refund suits lies in case law and tradition. The cases that discuss the
burden of proof cite the common-law heritage of refund actions as a major reason why the taxpayer bears the burden of proof.1 42 According to
these cases, placing the burden on taxpayers is a natural consequence of
this heritage since historically the action to recover on a claim for a refund is in the nature of an action for money had and received. 14 3 As
described in the previous section, the common-law count for money had
and received alleged an indebtedness to the plaintiff for money had and
received by the defendant to and for the use of the plaintiff.I44 Thus, it
was incumbent upon the claimant to show that the government had
money which belonged to him. 145 The application of the common-law
rationale for the burden of proof then should be consistent with the ra142. Stone v. White, 301 U.S. 532, 534 (1937). In David v. Phinney, 350 F.2d 371 (5th Cir.
1965), the Fifth Circuit held that:
Since the action for refund of taxes is in the nature of a common law action for
money had and received and is governed by equitable principles, the burden of proof
is upon the taxpayer to prove not only that the determination of the tax was wrong,
but to produce evidence from which another and proper determination could be
made.
Id. at 376 (citing 10 MERTENS LAW OF FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION 58A.35. (1965)).
143. See Flora v. United States, 362 U.S. 145, 186 (1960) (Whitaker, J., dissenting); Stone
v. White, 301 U.S. 532, 534 (1937); David v. Phinney, 350 F.2d 371, 376 (5th Cir. 1965);
Compton v. United States, 334 F.2d 212, 216 (4th Cir. 1964).
144. 15 THE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PLEADING AND PRACTICE, 53 (1899).
145. Lewis v. Reynolds, 284 U.S. 281, 283 (1932).
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tionale in allocating the burden of proof to taxpayers. This thesis is
demonstrated in the following sections.
(1)

The Affirmative of Tax Issues

Despite the dubious underpinnings of the principle that the party
who bears the affirmative of an issue bears the burden of proof, 46 the
burden of proof in refund cases demonstrates a similar thrust. For example, in 1877 the Supreme Court ruled that the burden of proof is on the
party asserting the affirmative of an issue in a case brought by a claimant
for refund of paid federal import duties. 147
In 1934, Judge Learned Hand upheld a taxpayer's challenge of an
arbitrary assessment, noting that the presumption of correctness does not
extend beyond the assessment. In Judge Hand's view "[a]ny other result
would invert the ordinary rules of procedure by imposing a burden of
establishing a negative upon the [taxpayer]."'' 48 Thus Judge Hand not
only followed the common-law dictum disfavoring the imposition of
proving a negative, but he also implicitly accepted application of common-law principles to tax cases.
Application of the common-law rule in tax refund cases is more difficult because of the taxpayer's two-part burden of proof. 49 The taxpayer's obligation to show the correct amount of the refund to which she
is entitled easily fits the common-law concept of an affirmative issue. The
taxpayer who seeks to establish that a certain sum should be returned by
the sovereign is asserting a positive proposition-thus allocation of the
burden of proof to that party is appropriate or at least consistent with the
common law.
On the other hand, the taxpayer's obligation to show that the government's assessment is arbitrary or erroneous more nearly requires the
establishment of a negative proposition. The court's response to this apparent dilemma has been to focus not on the wrongfulness of the government's conduct but rather on the taxpayer's obligation to establish the
existence of overpayment.150 This consequence remains consistent with
the common-law allocation of the burden of proof based not on a single
factor but on a combination of factors-none of which predominate.' 5'
In this case, the allocation of the burden of proof of a negative is out146.

147.
148.
Taylor,
149.
150.
151.

See supra text accompanying notes 34-42.

Arthur v. Unkart, 96 U.S. 118, 122 (1877).
Taylor v. Commissioner, 70 F.2d 619, 621 (2d Cir. 1934), aff'd sub nom. Helvering v.
293 U.S. 507 (1935).
See supra text accompanying notes 107-13.
Compton v. United States, 334 F.2d 212, 216 (4th Cir. 1964).
See supra text accompanying notes 66-69.
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weighed by the allocation of the burden of proof on the basis of a disfavored contention-the illegality of government conduct. 152 These
principles have been followed in a number of cases involving tax refund
suits. 153

As with the common-law rules in nontax cases, the relative weight
to be given the factors considered in determining the allocation of the
burden of proof as to a particular issue has not developed into an ordered
scheme. The few cases that even consider factors that might in any sense
conflict or lead to divergent results generally favor the government and
generally contain no discussion of either the rationale of favoring one
154
over another or the weight to be accorded a particular factor.
It may seem to the casual observer that because all tax cases are
procedurally similar, it would be reasonable to expect the development of
an order of priority regarding the weight to be accorded the common-law
factors influencing the burden of proof in tax cases. In one sense, however, an ordering of factors has not been necessary because application of
the factors in tax cases leads to similar results. As a general proposition,
the factors discussed above all lead to the conclusion that the taxpayer
bears the burden of proof as a general rule. The only exception to that
rule exists with respect to government allegations of fraud or other
wrongdoing. Thus, the only ordering of factors that emerges is predominance of the disfavored contention rule.
(2) The Taxpayer as Plaintiff
Many cases suggest that the taxpayer should bear the burden of
proof simply because the taxpayer is the plaintiff.15 5 In Rockwell v. Commissioner, the Ninth Circuit took pains to note that "in most litigation,
from time immemorial, the burden of proof-ie., the burden of persua56
sion-is on the plaintiff."'
Placing the burden of proof on the taxpayer in refund actions is consistent with common-law principles because the taxpayer is the initiator
152. E.g., Arthur v. Unkart, 96 U.S. 118, 122 (1877) (burden on claimant to show improper government collection of import duty).
153. Id. at 122; Wright v. United States, 249 F. Supp. 508, 514 (D. Nev. 1965).
154. E.g., Wright v. United States, 249 F. Supp. 508, 514 (D. Nev. 1965) (affirmative of
issues takes precedence over allegation of illegal conduct).
155. Helvering v. Taylor, 293 U.S. 507, 514 (1935); see Wickwire v. Reinecke, 275 U.S.
101, 105 (1927); Kurio v. United States, 429 F. Supp. 42, 49 (S.D. Tex. 1970); Wright v.
United States, 249 F. Supp. 508, 514 (D. Nev. 1965).
156. Rockwell v. Commissioner, 512 F.2d 882, 887 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1015
(1975).
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of the action. 5 7 In a tax refund case, the government is content to do
nothing-the fisc has the money at issue in its coffers. The taxpayer is
the party who desires to alter the status quo by seeking to establish the
basis for a judgement in her favor. 5 8 Thus, according to the common
law, the taxpayer rightly should bear the burden of proof.
(3)

Least-Likely Scenario

No tax refund case has expressly dealt with the common-law rationale allocating the burden of proof to the party alleging the least-likely
scenario. In the majority of cases, the government would be unlikely to
fabricate an assessment of taxes due. Thus, the assessment is a likely, if
not always reasonable, picture of the taxpayer's obligation.1 59 As such,
the taxpayer's allegation of overpayment is the least-likely scenario and
therefore allocation of the burden of proof to the taxpayer is proper. To
be sure, speculation regarding the consistency of the common law in this
area does not, without case support, necessarily advance the thesis.
(4)

Disfavored Contention

The statutory provisions imposing the burden of proof on the IRS
neatly fall within the common-law scheme. Under common law, the
party alleging a disfavored contention bears the burden of proof.' 60 The
Supreme Court has recognized that a taxpayer who sues for a refund of
sums paid to the United States effectively is alleging illegal conduct by
the government and that as a result the taxpayer should bear the burden
of proof. 161 On the other hand, wherever the IRS bears the burden of
proof, the alleged taxpayer misconduct can be in some sense characterized as wrongful or morally reprehensible. 62 As such, the allocation of
the burden of proof to the IRS is consistent with the common-law allocation of the burden of proof.
Similarly, if the collection of revenue is viewed as a favored or positive aspiration of government policy, claiming funds in the government's
possession or resisting the commissioner's claim of nonpayment can be
157. See supra text accompanying notes 43-5 1.
158. See Taylor, 293 U.S. at 514.
159. Lest an overly optimistic impression of government conduct be created, see id. (government assessment erroneous and arbitrary); Scar v. Commissioner, 814 F.2d 1363 (9th Cir.
1987) (assessment based on wrong taxpayer's tax return).
160. See supra notes 52-54 and accompanying text.
161. Arthur v. Unkart, 96 U.S. 118, 122-23 (1877).
162. See supra text accompanying notes 117-29, 139-41 For example. the IRS bears the
burden in cases alleging fraud by the taxpayer, illegal payments made by the taxpayer, wrongful acts by foundation managers, and penalties incurred by reason of unreasonably accumulating corporate income. Id.
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seen as a disfavored contention. Allocating the burden of proof to the
taxpayer as a general proposition then is also consistent with this common-law allocation of the burden of proof.
The statutory provisions regarding the government's burden of
proof in cases involving fraud neatly illustrate the application of fundamental burden of proof theory. For example, the premise of the burden
of proof is that the party upon whom the burden devolves must lose if the
burden is not met. It follows that in a case that involves both a deficiency and a civil fraud penalty, and in which neither the taxpayer or the
government are able to meet their respective burdens of proof, the taxpayer would lose on the issue of the tax deficiency liability and yet the
government likewise would lose on the issue of imposing fraud penalties.
In Carter v. Campbell, the Fifth Circuit reached precisely such a result. 163 The Campbell court followed the common-law approach-in
other words, the price to be paid for the failure to meet one's burden of
proof is that the case, or at least the issue at stake, must be lost to the
party bearing the burden of proof.164 More specifically, the court noted
that the failure of the taxpayer to meet the burden of proof with respect
to the deficiency did not bear on and did not lessen the government's
burden of proof on the issue of fraud. 165
Despite this illustration, there is some suggestion that the government's burden of proof in cases involving fraud flows not from the common-law allocation of the burden to the party alleging a disfavored
contention but from the rule requiring a party to prove affirmative issues. 16 6 The thrust of this line of authority is that it would be unfair to
require the taxpayer to prove a negative, the absence of fraud, in such
cases. 167 Thus, the allocation of the burden of proof to the IRS in cases
involving fraud is consistent with either of these common-law allocation
rules.
(5) Evidence Uniquely Within the Taxpayer's Knowledge
Under our system of self-reporting of tax liability, the taxpayer ini163. Carter v. Campbell, 264 F.2d 930 (5th Cir. 1959).
164. Id. at 936; see supra text accompanying note 25.
165. Carter, 264 F.2d at 936-39.
166. An early treatise, in which a member of the Board of Tax Appeals collaborated,
suggested that the burden of proof in tax cases in general was based on the taxpayer's allegation of the affirmative nature of issues. K. BREWSTER & J. IVINS, HOLMES AND BREWSTER'S
FEDERAL TAX APPEALS 230 n. 43 (1927).
167. Trainer v. United States, 145 F. Supp. 786, 787 (E.D. Pa. 1956) (taxpayer may allege
a negative, i.e., absence of fraud, without assuming the burden of proof); Senate Hearings,
supra note 89, at 25-26.
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tially decides the extent and amount of her statutory obligation to pay
tax. The taxpayer in such cases generally possesses the objective evidence. Certainly, with the exception of filed returns and information
provided by the taxpayer, the IRS is in a poor position to establish an
affirmative case. The common-law allocation of the burden of proof to
the party in possession of the evidence is clearly appropriate. 168 This
169
idea has been uniformly supported in tax cases.
If, as noted above, the burden of proof exists as a matter of adjudicatory necessity to provide guidance, reduce confusion, and add structure,
the allocation of the burden of proof to the party in possession of relevant
knowledge surely meets this goal. While the cases unfortunately do not
make this point clear, this aspect of allocation of the burden of proof is
implicit in the cases.170 The IRS has emphasized this matter in opposing
any change to the burden of proof rules. 17 1 By placing the burden of
proof on the party in possession of relevant information, the possibility of
destruction of adverse information is minimized and time is saved by
making that party responsible for culling through its own records to meet
its burden. Placing the burden of proof on the government in tax cases
would detract from these goals. Taxpayers might be tempted to destroy
adverse relevant evidence and collection costs would increase because of
the IRS' new difficulty in finding relevant information.
(6)

Allocation Based on Statute

The Internal Revenue Code provides scant support of the allocation
of the burden of proof to the taxpayer. Despite the existence and apparently well-settled nature of the general rule, nowhere does the rule appear
in the Code itself. Only indirectly does the burden of proof rule find
168. See supra text accompanying notes 58-61.
169. E.g., Campbell v. United States, 365 U.S 85, 96 (1961) (ordinary burden is not placed
on a litigant to prove fact only within knowledge of her adversary); United States v. Rexach,
482 F.2d 10, 16 (1st Cir. 1973) (burden on taxpayer based, inter alia, on "likelihood that
taxpayer will have access to the relevant information"), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1039 (1975);
Llorente v. Commissioner, 74 T.C. 260, 274 n.3 (1980) (Tannenwald, J., concurring) (quoting
Rexach, 482 F.2d at 16).
170. Weise v. Commissioner, 93 F.2d 921, 923 (8th Cir. 1938) (burden of proof on taxpayer where facts and evidence peculiarly within his control and knowledge); Taylor v. Commissioner, 76 F.2d 904, 906 (2d Cir. 1935) (A. Hand, J.) (taxpayer has burden because of
better chances to find relevant evidence); Carrano v. Commissioner, 70 F.2d 319, 321 (2d Cir.
1934) (L. Hand, J.) (taxpayer is justly charged with the burden of proof on issues as to which
he has access to evidence).
171. Taxpayers' Bill of Rights: Hearings before the Subcommittee on Private Retirement
Plans and Oversightof the Internal Revenue Service of the Committee on Finance, 100th Cong.,
1st Sess. 242 (1987) (taxpayer in best position to present evidence while IRS not in a position
to know relevant facts); House hearings, supra note 89, at 908-09.
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legislative approval. An oblique reference to the general rule is contained
in the legislative history of section 7422(e) of the Code. Section 7422(e)
governs the procedure if the federal district court and the Tax Court
have concurrent jurisdiction over the same case. In such an event, the
section provides that the burden of proof as to government counterclaims
is on the taxpayer if jurisdiction is retained by the district court. The
legislative history mentions in a single sentence that the intent of the
statute is to ensure that the taxpayer will have the same burden of proof
in the district court as would have been the case had the action been
pursued in the Tax Court. 172 Because the Tax Court by its own rule
allocates the burden of proof to the taxpayer, the Congress by its refer173
ence at least indicates its knowledge of the general rule.
The legislative history relating to the Code provisions that expressly
allocate the burden of proof to the government contain little or no discussion as to the rationale for these exceptions to the general rule. The enactments are based solely on the penal nature of particular instances in
which the burden of proof is borne by the government and do not explicitly recognize the existence of the broader rule allocating the burden of
proof to the taxpayer. 174 At the same time, congressional recognition of
the propriety of placing the burden of proof on the party alleging a disfavored position (i.e., the penal or quasi-criminal nature of these provisions) is consistent with the general common-law approach.
B. Tax Court Allocation of the Burden of Proof
The adoption of the taxpayer burden of proof rules in the Tax Court
also reflect a common-law derivation. In 1925, during hearings before
the House of Representatives, one of the original appointees of the Board
of Tax Appeals, James S. Ivins, explained the Board's rationale in adopting a rule imposing the burden of proof on taxpayers. First, Ivins stated
that the Board of Tax Appeals was following the practice of all courts
since the beginning of civilization: the moving party, the plaintiff or the
initiator of an action, must take the burden of going forward. 175 Second,
172. S. REP. No. 622, 83d Cong., 2d Sess., ch. 76, reprinted in 1954 U.S. CODE CONG. &
ADMIN. NEWS 4621, 5261.

173. Tax Court Rule 142(a); 60 T.C. 1057, 1133 (1973); see supra text accompanying notes
93-95.
174. S. REP. No. 960, 70th Cong., 1st Sess. 38 (1928) (proceedings involving civil fraud
resemble penal suits); S. REP. No. 552, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. (1969), reprinted in 1969 U.S.
CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS, 2027, 2059 (self dealing of foundation managers is consistent
with proceedings related to civil fraud).
175. House Hearings,supra note 89, at 908-09; see Nicholls, North, Buse Co. v. Commissioner, 56 T.C. 1225, 1233-34 (1971), acq. 1977-2 C.B. 2; Estate of Falese v. Commissioner, 58
T.C. 895, 897-99 (1972).
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Ivins noted that if the Board did not have such a rule, the commissioner
could not sustain this burden of proof because the taxpayer possessed the
relevant evidence.' 76 While the Tax Court has never explained its allocation of the burden of proof except through reliance on rule 142, the court
has suggested that the rule is based in part on the taxpayer's unique ac17 7
cess to knowledge relevant to any given case.
A court reviewing a Tax Court decision must also place the burden
of proof on taxpayers in compliance with Tax Court Rule 142, notwithstanding the absence of statutory guidelines or the existence of the common-law allocation rules. This situation does not pose a significant
problem since the promulgation of rule 142 harmonizes with the common-law tradition regarding the allocation of the burden of proof. Indeed, the Second Circuit in Golbert v. Renegotiation Board 178 upheld the
rule, noting that unless the Tax Court's promulgation of the rule was
arbitrary or capricious, the court must abide by it. According to the
Golbert court, "[t]he Congressional history of the Tax Court remedy is in
full accord with the view that Congress intended the Tax Court to provide for rules governing the burden of proof.... The determination that
the burden is upon the petitioner is not contrary to Congressional
79
intent."
C.

Unique Tax Allocation Rationale

As expected, there also exists a common rationale for allocating the
burden of proof in both refund and Tax Court suits that reflects the
unique nature of the tax system. These tax justifications necessarily are
interrelated to some extent and none is independent of the others. Yet
each deserves separate consideration. The following sections discuss the
presumption of correctness, the government's need for revenue, and the
taxpayer's possession of evidence as independent justifications for the
current allocation of the burden of proof.
176. House Hearings,supra note 89, at 908-09. Interestingly, the hearings considered the
IRS use of the power of subpoena to obtain relevant evidence to satisfy its burden of proof if
the taxpayer were relieved of the burden. Ivins' response is telling. He stated that use of the
subpoena power would not work because "there are a number of taxpayers who do not keep
any comprehensible books. They keep nothing but a checkbook and in that checkbook there
may be reflected deposits in the banks which amount to two or three times the taxpayer's
income." Id.
177. Church of Scientology v. Commissioner, 83 T.C. 381, 468 (1984); see Goodmon v.
Commissioner, 761 F.2d 1522, 1524 (1lth Cir. 1985); Rager v. Commissioner, 775 F.2d 1081,
1083 (9th Cir. 1985); Hawkins v. Commissioner, 713 F.2d 347, 353 (8th Cir. 1983); S. & H.,
Inc. v. Commissioner, 78 T.C. 234, 242 (1982).
178. 254 F.2d 416 (2d Cir. 1958).
179. Id. at 417.
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burden of proof serves laudable goals and that, given judicial oversight of
tax cases, little fundamental fairness is sacrificed.
(3)

Unique Knowledge: The Taxpayer's Possession of Evidence

The most significant problem that arises with respect to shifting the
burden of proof to the IRS is the practical consideration that the commissioner could not sustain the burden, because he does not possess the
needed evidence. Under the system of self-reporting tax liability, the taxpayer possesses the evidence relevant to the determination of tax liability. 193 It simply is fair to place the burden of persuasion on the taxpayer,
given that he knows the facts relating to his liability, because the commissioner must rely on circumstantial evidence, most of it coming from
the taxpayer and the taxpayer's records.194
To be fair it should be noted that the proposals to shift the burden of
proof to the IRS provide that if the taxpayer is uniquely in the possession
of relevant information, the taxpayer must present a minimum amount of
information necessary to support his position.195 This safety valve seems
to place the burden of production on the taxpayer without relieving the
government of the overall burden of proof. The provision has two fundamental flaws. First, the stated exception will apply in nearly all tax cases
because under our self-reporting system, it is the taxpayer who is generally in unique possession of evidence. Second, because the burden of production works only to place a matter within a jury's competence without
shifting the burden of persuasion, the difficulties with the new rule discussed below will remain.
IV.

An Appraisal of the Proposed Change in Burden of Proof
in Tax Cases

It has been observed that, by allocating the burden of proof, courts
generate "stop gap rules for adjudicating imperfectly clarified disputes."' 19 6 While the development of the common-law allocation rules in
tax cases can hardly be characterized as a stop gap approach, the observation has a certain amount of validity in tax cases. The Internal Revenue Code is silent as to the taxpayer's possession of the general burden of
proof, thus, making the application of the common-law allocation principles necessary. The omission is glaring since the Code contains a number
193. House Hearings,supra note 89, at 908-09.
194. Id. at 887.
195. See supra note 12.
196. Fletcher, Two Kind of Legal Rules: A Comparative Study of Burden of Persuasion
Practicesin CriminalCases, 77 YALE L.J. 880, 894 (1968).
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of specific provisions allocating the burden of proof to the IRS in certain

narrow circumstances.

197

Codification of the exceptions without codifi-

cation of the general rule seems at first glance an oversight of monumental proportion. A reasonable speculation as to the source of the omission
may be the unpopularity of both the tax and the tax collector. 198 One
can scarcely imagine any legislator who desires reelection sponsoring legislation imposing on her constituents a burden that might be considered,
at best, an unnecessary coddling of the despised tax collector. 199
197. See supra text accompanying notes 116-41.
198. Examples of the tax collector's unpopularity abound. For example, according to legend, Lady Godiva's notorious ride was taken to fulfill a condition upon which her husband,
Leofric Earl of Mercia, had promised to relieve his subjects of a tax. WEBSTER'S NEW COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 493 (1973) (Godiva defined). The Bible, in a less than flattering context, lumps in the same category tax collectors with sinners and those who disobey the law.
Matthew 9:9 to 9:13. Even Henry VIII experienced difficulty with tax collectors. During his
reign, Henry VIII caused to be enacted a statute imposing penalties on tax collectors who
failed to turn over to him taxes collected from his subjects. An Act for Collectors and Receivers, 1541, 34 & 35, Hen. VIII, ch. 2. See J. ADAMS, SECRETS OF THE TAX REVOLT (1984); R.
HAWS, A BRIEF HISTORY OF AMERICAN RESISTANCE TO TAXATION, INCOME TAX COMPLI-

113 (1983).
199. The IRS'sfantasy in this regard might be a significant amendment to I.R.C. § 7454 as
follows:
Sec. 7454. Burden of Proof
(a) In General.-Except as otherwise provided in this section, in any suit or proceeding involving a deficiency, or the recovery of any internalrevenue tax alleged to
have been erroneously or illegally assessed or collected, or any penalty claimed to have
been collected without authority,or of any sum alleged to have been excessive or in any
manner wrongfully collected, the burden ofproofin such suit or proceedingshall be on
the taxpayer.
(b) Fraud.-In any suit or proceeding involving the issue whether the taxpayer
or petitioner has been guilty of fraud with the intent to evade tax, the burden of proof
shall be upon the Secretary.
(c) Foundation Managers.-In any proceeding involving the issue whether a
foundation manager (as defined in § 4946(b)) has "knowingly" participated in an act
of self-dealing (within the meaning of § 4941), participated in an investment which
jeopardizes the carrying out of exempt purposes (within the meaning of § 4944), or
agreed to the making of a taxable expenditure (within the meaning of § 4945), or
whether the trustee of a trust described in § 501(c)(21) has "knowingly" participated
in an act of self-dealing (within the meaning of § 4951) or agreed to the making of a
taxable expenditure (within the meaning of § 4952), the burden of proof in respect of
such issue shall be upon the Secretary.
(d) Cross References.(1) For provisions relating to burden of proof as to transferee liability, see
§ 6902(a).
(2) For provisions relating to burden of proof as to illegal payments. see
§ 162(c).
(3) For provisions relating to burden of proof as to counterclaims in a district
court or the United States Claims Court, see § 7422(e).
(4) For provisions relating to burden of proof as to certain penalties. see
§ 6703 (a).
ANCE
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(1) Presumption of Correctness
As noted above, a presumption of correctness arises from the IRS
determination of deficiency. 180 The presumption remains until the taxpayer produces competent and relevant evidence to support her position. 181 When the taxpayer comes forward with such evidence, the
presumption vanishes and the case must be decided upon the evidence
82
presented.'
The presumption derives from the common-law presumption of administrative regularity.18 3 Clearly the Board of Tax Appeals had this
presumption in mind in adopting its rule that the taxpayer has the bur84
den of proof in these circumstances. 1
Government need, specifically the need for revenue, is the most important reason why the determination is presumed correct. The presumption facilitates revenue collection. The courts have consistently
held that "the right of the United States to collect its internal revenue by
summary administrative proceedings has long been settled... [because]
property rights must yield provisionally to governmental need."' 18 5 This
need for revenue forms the next major consideration in allocating the
burden of proof to taxpayers.
(2) The Government's Need for Revenue
The government's need for a steady flow of revenue may be the most
genuine, if not the most frequently cited, reason for placing the burden of
proof on the taxpayer. In Bull v. United States,1s 6 an action to recover an
overpayment of income tax, the Court frankly discussed this concern:
[T]axes are the lifeblood of government and their prompt and certain
availability an imperious need. Time out of mind, therefore, the sovereign has resorted to more drastic means of collection. The assessment
180. See Welch v. Helvering, 290 U.S. 11I,
115 (1933); see supra text accompanying notes
78-85.
181. Welch, 290 U.S. at 115; Niles Bement Pond Co. v. United States, 281 U.S. 357, 361
(1930); Cohen v. Commissioner, 266 F.2d 5, 11 (9th Cir. 1959); A & A Tool & Supply Co. v.
Commissioner, 182 F.2d 300, 305 (10th Cir. 1950); Dairy Home Co. v. United States, 180 F.
Supp. 92, 95 (D. Minn. 1960).
182. Barnes v. Commissioner, 408 F.2d 65, 69 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 836 (1969);
Compton v. United States, 334 F.2d 212, 216 (4th Cir. 1964); A & A Tool and Supply Co., 182
F.2d at 304.
183. United States v. Rexach, 482 F.2d 10, 16 (1st Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1039
(1975); 9 J. WIGMORE, supra note 15, at 625.
184. Mr. Ivins observed that "the courts have always held the same with respect to all tax
assessments, that the action of the assessing body or officer is prima facie presumed correct."
House Hearings,supra note 89, at 908-09.
185. Phillips v. Commissioner, 283 U.S. 589, 595 (1931).
186. 295 U.S. 247 (1935).
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is given the force of a judgement, and if the amount assessed is not paid
when due, administrative officials may seize the debtor's property to
satisfy the debt ....

Thus, the usual procedure for recovery of debts is

reversed in the field of taxation. Payment precedes defense and the
burden of proof, normally on the claimant, is shifted to the
taxpayer. 187
Similarly, in the 1931 refund case Champ Spring Co. v. United
States, 1 8 the Court explained why the burden of proof rules should be so
applied: "The issue in the case is: To whom does the money in equity,
justice, and good conscience belong? If the plaintiff fails to show that it
' 89
has a superior right to that of the defendant, it cannot recover."'
Mr. Ivins, testifying before the House of Representatives, was even
more blunt. He predicted: "[i]f you place the burden of proof on the
Commissioner, you might as well repeal the income tax law and pass the
hat because you will practically be saying to the taxpayer, 'How much do
you want to contribute toward the support of the government?"'190
Placing the burden of proof on the government has also been seen as
encouraging "taxpayer delay and inaction, thereby imposing on the government the costs ...

of both borrowing money to meet the gap of un-

paid taxes and of initiating litigation."' 19' The Tax Court has observed
that out of necessity "the Government's burdens in collecting the reve92
nue must be few and light."'
All of these authorities accept as a premise the government's need
for revenue. What follows from that premise is the importance of economic efficiency in the tax collection. Hence, the courts willingly embrace the concept that the burden of proof should rest on the taxpayer in
tax cases. This allocation of the burden of proof is thus viewed as a minor taxpayer inconvenience to be tolerated in achieving this economic
efficiency.
In the rhetoric of the populists, however, the procedural convenience gained from the current burden of proof rule must yield to basic
concepts of fairness. What is ignored in the process is that the current
187. Id. at 259-60; see Nichols v. United States, 74 U.S. 122, 129-30 (1868); United States
v. Janis, 428 U.S. 433, 440-41, reh'g denied, 429 U.S. 874 (1976).
188. 47 F.2d 1 (8th Cir. 1931).
189. Id. at 3. As Judge Hand held, "A plaintiff, seeking an affirmative judgement measured in dollars, must prove how much is due. His claim is for money paid and he must show
that every dollar he recovers is unjustly withheld." Taylor v. Commissioner, 70 F.2d 619, 621
(2d Cir.), aff'd sub nom. Helvering v. Taylor, 293 U.S. 507 (1934).
190. House Hearings,supra note 89, at 907.
191. United States v. Rexach, 482 F.2d 10, 17 (1st Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1039
(1975).
192. Church of Scientology v. Commissioner, 83 T.C. 381, 468 (1984).
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While Congress' reluctance to enact expressly the judicially accepted burden of proof allocation to the taxpayer is understandable, if
not defensible, a change in the rule to allocate the burden of proof to the
IRS betrays a certain naivete. 20 0 The common-law allocation of the burden of proof to the taxpayer is a tradition of long standing. Indeed the
common-law development of the rules allocating the burden of proof in
tax cases apparently flowed from the use of the burden of proof as a tool
for adjusting the interests of competing parties. 20 To the extent that it is
founded on common sense, this allocation ought not to be lightly brushed
aside. Maintenance of the status quo, however, does little to justify the
present rule. There are, however, good reasons for placing the burden on
the taxpayer.
Three major considerations for not shifting the burden of proof in
tax cases to the IRS are (1) the fact that, under our system of voluntary
reporting, knowledge of a taxpayer's deeds or misdeeds regarding the
payment of tax are uniquely within the taxpayer's knowledge; (2) the
government's need for revenue; and (3) that a self-reporting system of tax
collection depends on public confidence. 20 2 Each consideration warrants
discussion.
The point has been made that it is unfair to impose the burden of
proof upon the IRS because the taxpayer has access to the information
200. Senate Bill 604 originally provided and House Bill 634 presently provides that if information is exclusively within the possession of the taxpayer, the taxpayer may be required to
present a minimum amount of information to support her position. S. 604, 100th Cong., 1st
Sess. § 16(a) (1987); H.R. 634, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. (1987); see supra note 12. The language
of the proposal appears to put the burden of production on the taxpayer when the taxpayer is
in possession of relevant evidence. See supra note 12. A problem with such an approach is
that a taxpayer would be unlikely voluntarily to keep information that would undermine any
position taken.
One possibility to consider is whether the presumption of correctness that attaches to the
commissioner's findings would remain if the burden of proof were shifted in either the Tax
Court or refund suits. The presumption of correctness is utilized for essentially the same reasons given for imposing the burden of proof on the taxpayer, that is, the presumption of administrative regularity, the likelihood that the taxpayer will have access to the relevant
information, and the desirability of bolstering the record-keeping requirements of the Code.
United States v. Rexach, 482 F.2d 10, 16 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1039 (1973). The
presumption of administrative regularity is a reference to a traditional assumption in any litigation involving the government: the actions of officials are in accordance with the law. See 9
J. WIGMORE, supra note 15, at 625.

Maintaining the presumption in favor of the IRS would mean that even if the government
held the burden of proof, the taxpayer would have the initial burden of production. In order to
prevail, the taxpayer would have to present sufficient evidence to overcome the presumption
favoring the government's assessment.
201. Fletcher, supra note 196, at 894.
202. See supra text accompanying notes 179-86.
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that bears upon his tax liability.20 3 While this alone may justify the con-

tinuation of the existing rule, one may ponder the logical response if the
roles were reversed. One probable result would be increasing the reporting requirements to enable the IRS to meet its burden of proof.2° 4 Given
the recent proliferation of legislation that increases reporting requirements and penalties for understating or overstating value, and other legislation to curb tax abuses, a likely response to changing the burden of
proof would be pressure to increase such enactments to stem increased
abuse of the self-reporting system.2 0 5 Thus taxpayers could expect the
possibility of greater government intrusion into their personal affairs.
The greater reporting requirements necessarily will increase the costs to
both the taxpayer and the government. Taxpayer compliance with increased reporting requirements will increase taxpayer accounting costs,
while commitment of greater resources to monitor and enforce compli20 6
ance will increase government's costs.
A tax system in which the burden of proof is borne by the government does little to encourage the preservation of records held by the taxpayer; on the contrary, such a system would lend itself to easy
concealment of tax obligation. Noncompliance with the revenue laws
increases when information regarding a taxpayer's obligation either is not
available to the IRS or when the IRS does not have a source of evidence
independent of the taxpayer. 20 7 As the likelihood of successful conceal20 8
ment of tax obligations increases, so too will noncompliance.
203. See supra text accompanying notes 187-88.
204. An example of this approach is shown by I.R.C. § 6703(a) (1987) which places the
burden of proof on the IRS in cases involving the promotion of abusive tax shelters under
I.R.C. §§ 6700, 6701, 6702 (1987) . The enactment of I.R.C. § 6703 (1987) was followed by
the enactment of I.R.C. §§ 6111, 6112 (1987) which created new reporting requirements with
respect to tax shelters. See LeDuc, The Legislative Response to the 97th Congress to Tax Shelters, The Audit Lottery and other forms of Intentional or Reckless Noncompliance, 18 TAX
NOTES 363, 392 (1983).
205. See, e.g., I.R.C. § 6111 (1987) (requiring registration of tax shelters), § 6112 (1987)
(requiring lists of investors in certain tax shelter), §§ 6659-61 (1987) (relating to valuation
overstatements and understatements), § 6700 (1987) (relating to promotion of abusive tax shelters), § 6701 (1987) (penalties relating to aiding understatement of tax), § 6702 (1987) (frivolous return penalties), § 6706 (1987) (information requirements on original issue discount
issues), § 6707 (1987) (penalties for failure to register tax shelters). The foregoing list is illustrative and is not intended to be exhaustive.
206. Senate Bill 604's application of the Regulatory Flexibility Act will be undermined
because reporting will increase and become more complex. See supra text accompanying note
186.
207. A. WEINER & M. ERNST, PROPOSALS TO DETER AND DETECT THE UNDERGROUND
CASH ECONOMY, INCOME TAX COMPLIANCE 293, 295 (1983).

208. Hoeflich, Of Reason, Gamesmanship, and Taxes; A Jurisprudentialand Gaines Theoretical Approach to the Problem of Voluntary Compliance, 2 AM. J. TAX POL 9, 53-58 (1983).
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The widely acknowledged need for revenue is at best uncomfortably
juxtaposed with measures that reduce the efficiency of tax collection. No
one seems to quarrel with the proposition that the government requires
revenue.20 9 If one accepts that proposition, a logical corollary is that the
revenue collection system should be efficient so that the revenue collected
fulfills purposes other than simply tax collection. Shifting the burden of
proof to the IRS necessarily will increase its costs of collection by requiring an expansion of its investigatory function and by making trials more
expensive by virtue of the search for evidence of taxpayer wrongdoing. 2 10
In short, the entire tax collection system would become more economically inefficient. While the conduct of IRS employees may occasionally
be less than exemplary, the proposed cure is worse than the disease. Efficiency in tax collection simply does not equate to inherent unfairness in
the tax collection system. To sacrifice efficiency with respect to the burden of proof is ill advised.
The backbone of our revenue system is voluntary compliance. 2 11 In
order to raise revenue, the United States relies on its citizens to come
forward and meet their obligations under the revenue laws. Despite
growing concerns of an "underground economy," there is evidence that
the IRS is examining fewer tax returns and collecting more revenue than
ever before.2 12 On the other hand, the concerns regarding revenue noncompliance are not trivial. Former IRS Commissioner Roscoe Egger has
estimated that in 1974 taxpayers voluntarily paid 85% of their total income tax liability-a number he estimated would fall to 81.6% by
1986.213 According to Egger, each one percent reduction in the level of
compliance would equate to a revenue loss of five billion dollars. 214
Meanwhile, difficulty in tax collection arising out of shifting the burden
of proof to the IRS could result in an increase in tax rates or the shoul209. See supra text accompanying notes 1-5.
210. If a study of trial costs were undertaken, an educated estimate likely would reveal
greater government expenditure of resources in cases in which it has the burden of proof. For
example, the fraud penalty owes its existence in part to a recognition that the government must
be reimbursed for the heavy expense of investigation. Helvering v. Mitchell, 303 U.S. 391, 401
(1938).
211. United States v. Geneves, 405 U.S. 93, 104 (1972) (the tax system is largely dependant on voluntary compliance); United States v. Fowler, 794 F.2d 1446, 1451 (9th Cir. 1986)
(Reinhardt, J., dissenting) (tax system committed to voluntary compliance); Tax Reform Proposals: Hearings before the Senate Committee on Finance,99th Cong., 1st Sess. 8 (1985) (testimony of Commissioner Egger); Zelensky, Efficiency and Income Taxes: The Rehabilitation of
Tax Incentives, 64 TEX. L. REv. 973, 1027 n. 106 (1986).
212. M. SALTZMAN, supra note 70, 8-3 n.3.
213. Tax Reform Proposals: Hearing before the Committee on Finance, 99th Cong., 1st
Sess. 12 (Jun. 12, 1985) (testimony of Commissioner Egger).
214. Id.
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dering of an increased tax burden by honest or at least nonlitigious taxpayers. The increased tax burden might result from increased
inefficiency in tax collection or from an increased tendency to let the IRS
attempt to prove its case with the burden of proof hurdle raised.
Conclusion
Shifting the burden of proof to the IRS is an appealing idea. Unreflective enthusiasm over the adoption of such a rule, however, may well
obscure the importance of the tax burden of proof. Placing the burden of
proof on government would increase government litigation costs, escalate
government intrusion into taxpayers' affairs through increased reporting
requirements, and contribute to an increased lack of compliance with
existing revenue laws. In short, the apparently attractive notion of making the tax collector's job more difficult is short-sighted and simplistic.
Plato's observation that "[w]here there is an income tax, the just
man will pay more, and the unjust less" 21 5 would become an unfortunate
reality should Congress decide to shift the burden of proof to the IRS.

215.

Plato quoted in B. WOLFMAN & J.

HOLDEN,

supra note 3, at xviii.

